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1Visiting Associate Professor, Rutgers-Camden Law School.  I would like to thank James
Kushner for his helpful comments.  I would also like to thank the faculty of
Rutgers/Camden Law School for listening to my presentation on this paper, and various
faculty members from other schools (in particular Marci Hamilton and Lackland Bloom)
for listening to similar presentations and asking penetrating questions.   Any errors of
fact, law or logic are of course mine alone. 
2The concept of sprawl “evades a precise definition”.  Jeremy R. Meredith, Sprawl and
the New Urbanist Solution, 89 Va. L. Rev. 447, 448 (2003).  See also Thomas Benton
Bare, III, Recharacterizing the Debate: A Critique of Environmental Democracy and An
Alternative Approach to the Urban Sprawl Dilemma, 21 Va. Envtl. L. J. 455, 457  (2003)
(“There are many definitions of sprawl”).  But many definitions of sprawl suggest that
key characteristics of sprawl include, inter alia, dependency on automobiles and/or
settlement patterns (such as low population density) that tend to lead to such dependency. 
See, e.g., Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and the Fifth
Amendment, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 873, 874 (2000) (describing sprawl as “low-density,
land-consuming, automobile-dependent” development); William W. Buzbee, Sprawl’s
Dynamics: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Critique, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 509,
510 (2000) (“Sprawling urban forms typically are car dependent”).  See also infra notes
55-63 and accompanying text (explaining how low density leads to vehicle dependency).  
I accordingly define sprawl for purposes of this article as development oriented solely
towards automobiles, as opposed to pedestrians, bicyclists and public transit users.  
3See Miller v. Anckaitis, 436 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1970) (“use of an automobile [is
often] the only practical alternative to welfare”); Michael Lewyn, “Thou Shalt Not Put a
Stumbling Block Before the Blind”: The Americans with Disabilities Act and Public
Transit for the Disabled., 52 Hastings L.J. 1037, 1041 (2001) (“Stumbling Block”) (in
most small cities and suburbs, “auto ownership is virtually mandatory for a normal life”).
4See, e.g., Francesca Ortiz, Biodiversity, The City and Sprawl, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 145, 179-
80 (2002) (zoning regulations “imposing density restrictions and minimum lot sizes, for
example, can contribute to sprawl by forcing larger, more land consumptive
developments” and zoning also “encourages sprawl by separating different land uses
according to intensity of use” thus forcing developers “to move outward to build if their
uses are incompatible with available areas”); Stumbling Block, supra note 3, at 1055-56
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How Overregulation Creates Sprawl (Even In A City Without Zoning)
by Michael Lewyn1
I. Introduction: Sprawl, Zoning and Houston           
Numerous commentators have suggested that the spread-out, automobile-
dependent urban form (often referred to as “sprawl”)2 that dominates metropolitan
America3 is at least partially caused by government regulation of land use.4
(making similar points).
5See Lee Anne Fennel, Homes Rule, 112 Yale L.J. 617, 624 n. 29 (2002) (“Houston is the
only major American city to eschew zoning”); Bernard H. Siegan, Smart Growth and
Other Infirmities of Land Use Controls, 38 San Diego L. Rev. 693, 742 (2001)
(“Infirmities”).  One section of Houston’s municipal code allows the city’s planning
commission to serve as a zoning commission.  See Houston: Code of Ordinances, Sec.
33-22(a)(1),
http://livepublish.municode.com/LivePublish/newonlinecodes.asp?infobase=10123
(visited Mar. 6, 2003) (“Houston Code”).  This language was adopted “because at the
time [it was drafted] it was assumed that one day we [Houston] would have zoning and if
we should ever adopt zoning, the Planning Commission could step into that role without
a new ordinance.”  Private correspondence with Suzy Hartgrove, City of Houston (Dec.
12, 2002) (on file with author).  Because Houston never did adopt a comprehensive
zoning ordinance, this section is effectively a dead letter.  Instead, the planning
commission merely “reviews subdivision plats and variances for certain land
development regulations such as street width”.  Id.  
6See infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text (describing Houston as sprawling,
automobile-dependent city).  I note that in 2004, Houston began to operate a light rail
system.  See Juan Lozano, 1st light rail line opens in Houston, Houston Chronicle, Jan. 2,
2004, at 2, 2004 WL 56482365.   It is unclear, however, whether the rail line will
significantly change Houston’s commuting habits.  Id. (“Opponents said light rail will do
little . . . because it doesn’t reach those who live outside Houston’s inner core”).
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But at first glance, the fate of Houston, Texas may seem to rebut 
that theory.  Houston is America’s only large city without a formal zoning code.5   Yet 
Houston is as automobile-dependent and sprawling as many cities with zoning.6
It could therefore be argued that automobile-dependent sprawl is the inevitable 
result of the free market, based on the following chain of logic:
Assumption 1: Because Houston lacks zoning, Houston has an unregulated, 
unplanned real estate market.   In other words, Houston = the free market at work. 
Assumption 2: Houston is an automobile-dependent, sprawling city. In other 
words, Houston = an example of sprawl. 
Conclusion: Therefore, a city which (like Houston) allows the free market 
to govern land use will (like Houston) typically become an automobile-dependent, 
7The broader philosophical question of the appropriate extent of government regulation
is, however, beyond the scope of this article.  Cf. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and
Utopia (1974) (making case for minimal government).  Rather than addressing this issue,
I seek only to suggest that because sprawl in Houston (as in other cities) is at least
partially a result of government regulation, a preference for limited government does not
automatically justify a preference for pro-sprawl policies. 
8See Michael E. Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just An Environmental Issue, 84 Marq. L.
Rev. 301, 303-04 (2000) (“Not Just Environmental”) (quoting numerous conservative
and libertarian commentators expressing such sentiments).
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sprawling city- and sprawl is thus a product of the free market, rather than of government 
interference with consumer preferences.  In other words, because 
Houston = the free market at work, and Houston = sprawl, the free market leads to
sprawl.  The policy consequence of this chain of logic (at least for people who highly 
value limited government)7 is that government should not discourage sprawl, because 
what the free market has put together, government should not tear asunder.8
The purpose of this article is to evaluate this conclusion by addressing one of its 
underlying assumptions -  the assumption that Houston is a free-market role 
model.   Part II of the article describes that assumption (as well as Houston’s sprawling 
urban form).  Part III criticizes that assumption by explaining how municipal regulatory 
and spending policies have affected Houston’s urban form. Part IV discusses free-market 
alternatives to those government policies.
II. Background: The Case For Houston As Free-Market Sprawl
As noted above, some commentators suggest that Houston is in fact a role model 
for both free markets and sprawl.  These claims will be examined below. 
 A. Houston as Free-Market Role Model
Numerous commentators assert that Houston has adopted a laissez-faire policy of 
9See, e.g., Byron Shibata, Land Use Law in the United States and Japan: A Fundamental
Overview and Comparative Analysis, 10 Wash. U. J. L. &  Policy 161, 242 (2002)
(Houston has a “general laissez-faire approach to land-use regulation”); June Carbone,
Dukeminier and Krier as Narrative: The Stories We Tell In The First Year Property
Course, 32 Hous. L. Rev. 723, 741 (1995) (Houston’s “laissez-faire system” is an
“alternative to zoning”).  But see contra Teddy M. Kapur, Land Use Regulation in
Houston Contradicts the City’s Free Market Reputation, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. 10045 (2004)
(suggesting that Houston almost as heavily regulated as cities with zoning).  Kapur’s
article discussed some of the regulations discussed below but, unlike this article, does not
focus on the sprawl-producing effects of Houston’s regulatory scheme.
10Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 Journal of Law & Econ. 71, 75 (1970)
(“Non-Zoning”); Infirmities, supra note 5, at 695-96, 734-41; Bernard H. Siegan,
Conserving and Developing the Land, 27 San Diego L. Rev 279, 295-305 (1990)
(“Conserving”); Bernard H. Siegan, Keynote Address, 14 Envtl. L. 645, 646-51 (1984)
(“Keynote Address”); infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.  The purpose of Siegan’s
work is not to discuss sprawl or to critique Houston’s existing regulations, but to show
that Houston’s failure to enact a zoning code has not made Houston worse off than other
American cities.  See, e.g., Non-Zoning, supra. at 71 (Houston “a functioning, viable and
rapidly growing city”); 88 (rejecting claim that absence of zoning will “destroy values of
houses and often lead to blight and slum conditions”); Infirmities, supra note 5, at 695
(suggesting that absence of zoning has caused Houston to have more affordable housing
than other cities).  Because this article does not endorse zoning, it is not a rebuttal of
Siegan’s work.   But my emphasis is different from Siegan’s.  Siegan emphasizes the
differences between Houston and cities with zoning.  See infra notes 14-17 and
accompanying text.  By contrast, I emphasize the similarities between Houston and other
cities – that is, Houston’s departures from laissez-faire policies.  See Part III infra.
11Non-Zoning, supra note 10, at 75.
12Id. 
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unplanned, unregulated development.9  For example, Bernard Siegan so argues in a set of 
articles defending Houston’s refusal to enact a zoning code.10  Siegan asserts that 
land use regulation in Houston is “extremely modest when compared to what is contained 
in most zoning ordinances [because] Houston has no ordinance that sets forth specific 
restrictions on the uses that may be established on any property”11 - that is, no law 
providing that a given parcel may be used solely for residential use or commercial use.12
Siegan further writes that while other cities force builders to develop large homes on large 
13See, e.g. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (upholding ordinance allowing
construction of only one house per acre); Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law, sec. 5.28
at 5-28 (5th ed. 2003) (“Municipalities often control residential densities and amenities
through large-lot zoning and minimum house size restrictions”);  Julian Conrad
Juergensmeyer and Thomas E. Roberts, Land Use Planning and Development Regulation
Law, sec. 6.2 at 232 (2003 ed.) (“Minimum lot sizes of 5,000 square feet, 20,000 square
feet, 40,000 square feet, three acres and five acres are common”). 
14Infirmities, supra note 5, at 734. 
15Conserving, supra note 10, at 304-05.
16Id. at 305.  In particular, Siegan praises Houston’s low housing costs, and claims that
Houston is more affordable than cities with zoning.  See Infirmities, supra note 5, at 695. 
I note however, that in this regard Houston may be more similar to other American cities
than Siegan suggests.  For example, Siegan compares Houston favorably with Dallas,
which has zoning.  Id. But by 2002, housing prices in Houston and Dallas were similar. 
The median housing price in Houston was $138,000 (2.3 times the Houston area’s
median family income of $59,600) and the median housing price in Dallas was $155,000
(also 2.3 times that area’s median family income of $66,500).  See National Association
of Home Builders, Housing Opportunity Index,
http://www.nahb.org/reference_list.aspx?sectionID=135 (Visited Dec. 3, 2003).  Cf.
Kapur, supra note 9, at 10062 (questioning link between Houston’s low-cost housing and
absence of zoning)
17Id. 
18Infirmities, supra note 5, at 742.
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lots,13 in Houston “builders and developers determine the size of most building lots, not 
the planners and politicians.”14
Siegan therefore concludes that Houston “affords great opportunity for builders 
and developers to satisfy consumer demand”15 and that “resourcefulness and inventiveness 
are able to thrive in Houston because of the absence of their enemy, government 
regulation.”16 By contrast, in cities with zoning, “these talents are often spent in 
persuading or outmanuevering the zoning authorities.”17  In sum, Siegan views Houston is 
a libertarian role model, a city where government exercises “minimum control over the 
uses that will be made of [real] property.”18
And it is not just zoning opponents who treat Houston as an example of laissez-
19Panel Discussion, Discretionary Limits to Local Land-Use Control, 15 N.I.U. L. Rev.
651, 656 (1995).  See also Stephen Fox, Houston 2000: Looking Back,
http://www.livablehouston.com/good/articles/fox.html (Because Houston “stands alone
among major U.S. cities in refusing to adopt a zoning code . . . the urban landscape of
Houston is squalid”) (visited Feb. 8, 2004); Ross Anderson, Stay Out! A Guide to
Controlling Growth, Seattle Times, May 8, 1994, at B5, 1994 WL 3620423 (in Houston,
“antipathy to zoning leads to untamed ugliness”).  But see No Zoning, supra note 10, at
91 (attacks “ugliness” argument on ground that “it would seem impossible to evaluate the
aesthetics and physical composition of over 450 square miles of real estate [comprising
the city of Houston] and compare such a determination with a similar area elsewhere.”).  
20See Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and The
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 Yale Law & Policy Rev. 1, 19 (2003) (ULI the
“research wing” of the National Association of Real Estate Boards, a trade association for
realtors, developers, and mortgage bankers).
21
 David Crossley, Why The Interstate-10 Expansion Plan Needs Another Look, at
www.katycorridor.org/Presentations/Why-Crossley-1Aug02.doc (Visited Feb. 8, 2004)
(quoting remarks). See also Editorial, Dallas Morning News, Houston Race: Brown’s
Victory Shows Changes, Challenges, Dec. 9, 1997, at 22A, at 1999 WL 16183937
(Houston’s “no-zoning policies have given rise to considerable sprawl”); Patricia L. Kirk,
City On A Roll, Shopping Center World, Oct. 1, 2003 at 50, 2003 WL 11006419 (“A city
without zoning, Houston has become a poster child for urban sprawl”).
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faire land use policy.  Pro-regulation commentators also describe Houston this way- but 
rather than praising Houston, they claim that Houston’s land use policies have led to 
sprawl and ugliness. For example, one commentator states: “If you want to see what an 
unregulated environment looks like, go to Houston.  It is one of the ugliest developed 
cities in the world.”19  And the President of the Urban Land Institute (a real estate 
industry research organization)20 blames Houston’s sprawl on its lack of land use 
regulation, asserting that Houston is “a textbook example of the sprawl and hopscotch 
growth that comes with . . . a laissez faire business climate.”21
B. Houston Is A Sprawl City
Houston has a reputation as an unusually sprawling, automobile-
dependent city.  For example, one newspaper article describes Houston as “a city of 581 
22 Elisabeth Hickey, Houston Does Its Best To Give A Warm Howdy, Washington Times,
August 17, 1992, at D1, at 1992 WL 8136783.  See also Mike Snyder, “Smart Growth”
re-examines sprawl, Houston Chronicle, March 19, 2000 at 1, 2000 WL 4286902
(According to past president of American Institute of Architects’ Houston chapter, “If
you live in the typical [Houston] subdivision, you’ve got to get in your car and drive for
10 minutes just to get a quart of milk”).
23 Bruce Oren, More Of Us Should Live on Main Street, U.S.A., Houston Chronicle, Jan.
5, 1997 at 19, at 1997 WL 6533486.   See also Blair Kamin, Houston becoming a super
city in more ways than one, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 30, 2004, at 1, 2004 WL 67381452
(“Houston is sprawling and car-oriented”).
24As noted above, one common characteristic of sprawl is low density.  See note 2 supra
(citing numerous definitions); infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (low-density
communities typically very dependent on automobiles).
25Siegan appears to challenge this point, asserting that Houston “has a high population
density, greater than Dallas and Phoenix, zoned cities with which it is often compared.”
Infirmities, supra note 5, at 735.   As of the 2000 Census,  Dallas had slightly more
inhabitants per square mile than Houston. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2002 at 35-36
(122nd ed. 2002) (“2002 ABSTRACT”) (Dallas has 3470 people per square mile while
Houston has 3372).  Thus, Siegan’s assertion may be technically incorrect.  But more
importantly, Siegan’s claim is misleading because most large cities are far more dense
than Dallas, Phoenix, or Houston.  See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
26
 2002 ABSTRACT, supra note 25, at 33, 37. 
      27
 Id. at 36-38 (New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago only cities with more inhabitants than 
    Houston). The least dense of these three cities, Los Angeles, has 7877 residents per       
 square mile.  Id. at 37.  The other two (Chicago and New York) have over 10,000 residents  
square mile.  Id. at 36-38.
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square miles of unruly urban sprawl . . . no one walks in Houston”.22  Similarly, an article 
in Houston’s own newspaper asserts that “Houston’s sprawl is as ugly and pervasive as 
any city’s in the nation.”23 And Houston’s reputation has ample basis in reality.  For 
example:
*Houston is far less densely populated24 than most other cities of comparable 
size.25  The city of Houston has only 3372 people per square mile,26 less than half the 
density of any of the three cities larger than Houston,27 and fewer than six of the eight 
28Excluding Houston itself, of course.  Chicago, New York, Los Angeles, Philadelphia,
Dallas and San Diego are all more densely populated than Houston, while San Antonio
and Phoenix are slightly less dense.  Id.   Similarly, Houston’s entire urbanized area has
only 1970 people per square mile (fewer than every other urban region which, like
Houston and its suburbs, contains over 3 million people).    See Texas Transportation
Institute, 2003 Urban Mobility Study, Exhibit A-1,
http://mobility.tamu.edu/ums/appendix_a/ (visited Jan. 11, 2004) (“TTI Study”) (listing
density statistics for various urbanized areas); Greg Lacour and Megan Twohey, Growth
Spreads Out For Rural Charm, City Comfort, Charlotte Observer, April 20, 2003, at 1V,
at 2003 WL 17750224 (explaining that Census defines “urbanized area” as an area with
“a core of at least 1,000 residents per square mile, surrounded by areas with at least 500
people per square mile”); Debra Lynn Bassett, Ruralism, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 273, 286
(2003) (same).
29 See Lucas Wall, Bicyclists, officials press pedaling, Houston Chronicle, May 17, 2003,
at 31, 2003 WL 3259951.  
30See supra note 27 (New York, Chicago and Los Angeles only cities more populous than
Houston); Beth Barrett, Commutes Eat Up More Time in L.A., L.A. Daily News,
November 20, 2001, at N1, 2001 WL 6073379 (9% of Los Angeles residents use public
transit); Rob Bhatt, RTC asks planners for rail rethink, Las Vegas Business Press, August
3, 1998, at 1, 1998 WL 9786736 (53.4% of New York City residents take public transit to
get to work); Jacky Grimshaw, Public Transit Serves More Than Just the Poor, Chicago
Sun-Times, Sept. 29, 1995, at 32, 1995 WL 6673059 (one-third of Chicago residents use
public transit). 
31 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., HIGHWAY STATISTICS
2001, Table HM-72, 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/hs01/hm72.htm (visited March 3, 2003) (“Highway
Statistics”).  The only regions with higher per capita daily vehicle miles traveled are
Binghamton, New York, Newburgh, New York, and Sherman-Denison, Texas, id., – all
regions much smaller than Houston.   See 2002 ABSTRACT, supra note 25, at 32-34
(regions not listed as among “Large Metropolitan Areas” with over 250,000 people). 
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American cities with over 1 million people.28
*Houston is as automobile-dependent as any American city.  Only 5.9% of the city 
of Houston’s employed adults commute via public transit29 - fewer than in any of the cities 
larger than Houston.30
*Houstonians drive more than other Americans: The average Houstonian travels 
37.6 miles per day by automobile, more than residents of any other large American 
region.31
32 Surface Transportation Policy Project, Transportation Costs and the American Dream-
Spending Table, http://www.transact.org/report.asp?id=225 (visited Feb. 10, 2004)
(Household Spending”). Only in Dallas-Fort Worth is transportation spending higher.
Id.
33 Mukul Verma & Michael Antrobus, At a Crossroads With a New Urbanist, Greater
Baton Rouge Bus. Rep., April 29, 1997 at 39, at 1997 WL 9356512.  
34See supra note 21 (numerous commentators assert that absence of zoning causes
Houston’s sprawl)
35Non-Zoning, supra note 10, at 73 (Houston’s subdivision code first adopted in 1940,
and 3/4 of city’s developed areas subject to code); Kapur, supra note 9, at 10052.  
36Houston had 385,000 residents in 1940.  See Non-Zoning, supra note 10, at 72.  By
contrast, in 2000 Houston had over 1.9 million residents.  2002 ABSTRACT, supra note
25, at 36. 
37See Non-Zoning, supra note 10, at 73 (Houston’s regulations “generally common
elsewhere in the country”); Infirmities, supra note 5, at 742 (Houston’s subdivision and
traffic regulations “do not seem to vary significantly from those of other cities in its
region”).
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*As a result of all that driving, the average Houston household spends $9566 per 
year (or 20.1% of its income) on transportation-related expenses, more than its 
counterparts in all but one of America’s large metropolitan areas.32
Thus, Houston’s reputation as a poster child for sprawl is richly deserved.
III. Zoning Without Zoning: Or, Houston’s Regulations and Their Results
“Houston has no zoning and it also suffers from urban sprawl.”33  It could 
thus be argued that a causal relationship exists between Houston’s sprawl and its lack 
of zoning,34 and that Houston’s sprawl is solely a result of consumers’ preferences.   And 
if land use in Houston was completely deregulated, this argument might be a strong one.
But in fact, Houston’s city government regulates land use 
in a wide variety of ways.  Houston enacted a subdivision code in 1940,35  when that city 
was about one-fifth its current size.36  The code’s provisions are generally quite similar to 
regulations enacted in other American cities.37  Houston’s regulations and their 
38See Kapur, supra note 9, at 10054.  See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text
(discussing 1998 revisions to law).   
39See infra notes 42-51 and accompanying text (describing different rules governing
townhouses and their practical consequences).
40See Kapur, supra note 9, at 10054.
41See infra note 69 and accompanying text (describing 1998 revisions to law governing
townhouses).
42 Townhouses are “units attached side-by-side . . . with no residences above or below.” 
John Handley, Words To Shop By In Today’s Housing Market, Chicago Tribune, August
22, 1987, at 1, at 1987 WL 2979597. 
43See Non-Zoning, supra note 10, at 119.
44Id.
45Id. 
46Id. at 102 (“The minimum lot size permitted in new subdivisions is not unusual in a
large city.”). 
47Patricia Long Albee, Building neighborhood from scratch, Dallas Morning News,
August 10, 1998, at 1C, 1998 WL 13093722 (describing townhouse development). 
48Cindy Skyrzycki, If you’re looking for a home you can afford, U.S. News & World
Report, Dec. 5, 1983, at 67 (describing various townhouse developments). 
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consequences are discussed below.
A. Minimum Lot Sizes
Until 1998,38  Houston’s city code provided that the minimum lot size for 
detached39 single-family dwellings was 5000 square feet.40 And until 1998,41 Houston’s 
government made it virtually impossible for developers to build large numbers of non-
detached single-family homes such as townhouses,42 by requiring townhouses to sit on at 
least 2250 square feet of land.43  As Siegan admits, this law “tend[ed] to 
preclude the erection of lower cost townhouses”44 and thus effectively meant that 
townhouses “cannot be built for the lower and lower middle income groups.”45  Houston’s 
townhouse regulations, unlike its regulations governing detached houses,46 were 
significantly more restrictive than those of other North American cities.  For example, 
town houses may be as small as 647 square feet in Dallas,47 560 square feet in Phoenix48
49Condo Living, The Toronto Star, Nov. 9, 2002, 2002 WL 101967229.
50See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
51
 One acre contains 43,560 square feet.  See William A. McGeveran, Jr., ed. THE
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 622 (2002 ed.).  So if each house in a
neighborhood must sit on a 5000 square foot lot, the neighborhood will contain 8.7 such
houses per acre (43,560 divided by 500).  
52 I calculate as follows: Houston has 3372 people per square mile.  See 2002
ABSTRACT, supra note 25, at 37.  An acre contains 0.405 hectares and a square mile
contains 258.999 hectares.  See McGeveran, supra note 51, at 623.  Because 258.999
divided by 0.405 equals 639.5, a square mile contains 639.5 acres.  Thus, Houston has
5.27 people per acre (3372 divided by 639.5).  Because the average Houston household
contains 2.67 people, Houston has 1.97 households per acre (5.27 divided by 2.67).  See
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic Characteristics:
2000, http://censtats.census.gov/data/TX/1604835000.pdf (visited June 12, 2003) (noting
size of average Houston household).
53
 See John Williams, Mayoral campaign revs up in garage, Houston Chronicle, Jan. 13,
2003, at 15, at 2003 WL 3229966 (one mayoral candidate announced his candidacy on
3.8 acre house in city’s River Oaks section); Jennifer Frey, Water Over the Dam,
Washington Post, April 17, 2002, at C1, at 2002 WL 19154421 (River Oaks is “city’s
priciest neighborhood”). The fact that some people prefer lots larger than the statutory
minimum does not mean that Houston’s minimum lot sizes are irrelevant to the city’s
overall density.  Inevitably, some people will want more land than the statutory minimum
and be able to pay for it- but if Houston had no minimum lot size ordinance, other people
might be willing to pay less money for less land.  
54 See Infirmities, supra note 5, at 735 (less land devoted to residential occupancy in
Houston than in some cities with zoning).  Moreover, some areas of Houston are now
governed by stricter rules.  Since 2001, the Houston city code has allowed the city to set
up special low-density “minimum lot size areas” in order to preserve the character of
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and 390 square feet in Toronto, Canada.49
Houston’s anti-townhouse policy, combined with its minimum lot size requirement 
for detached houses, meant that almost all single-family development in Houston had to 
be on a lot of at least 5000 square feet50 (which means that single-family areas in Houston 
could have no more than 8.7 houses per acre).51  In fact, Houston has only about 2 
households per acre,52 because portions of Houston are used either for housing on lots 
larger than the statutory minimum53 or for purposes other than housing, such as stores, 
roads, and industry.54
existing neighborhoods and to “prevent high-density construction, such as townhouses,
on traditional single-family lots.” Martin Hajovsky, Home in the Heights, Houston
Chronicle, January 31, 2002 at 8, 2002 WL 3243352.  See also Houston Code, sec. 42-
213 (text of ordinance); Kapur, supra note 9, at 10055 (describing law); See City of
Houston, Chapter 42: Houston’s Land Development Ordinance, at
http://www.ci.houston.tx.us/departme/planning/download/chap42.pdf (visited Feb. 25,
2004) (describing similar rule allowing neighborhoods to create uniform setbacks from
street) (“Chapter 42"). The city council may establish such a minimum lot size zone if the
applicant has demonstrated sufficient neighborhood support and creation of a minimum
lot size area will further the goal of preserving prevailing densities.  Id., secs. 42-
213(g)(3) and (g)(4).  Thus, the city may freeze neighborhood densities at levels far
below 8.7 houses per acre if neighborhood residents support such limits.
55See, e.g., Robert H. Freilich, The Land Use Implications of Transit-Oriented
Development: Controlling the Demand Side of Transportation Congestion and Urban
Sprawl, 30 Urb. Law. 547, 552 n. 18 (1998) (“Most studies show that residential
densities of at least 7-15 dwelling units per acre are needed in order to encourage the
utilization of public transit”); Reid Ewing, Richard A. Schieber & Charles V. Zegeer,
Urban sprawl as a risk factor in motor vehicle occupant and pedestrian fatalities, 93 Am.
J. Pub. Health 1541, 1542, 2003 WL 12986698 (2003) (8 housing units per acre is “the
lower limit of density needed to support mass transit”).
56 See Freilich, supra note 55, at 552 and n. 18 (“in order to effectively encourage transit
utilization,  a development must be located so that residents are not required to walk a
distance of greater than a quarter mile to a transit station” because otherwise 
“commuters are required to travel too far to transit stations”).  
57See Eric Hanson, Voter’s Guide: City Council At-Large Races, Houston Chronicle,
October 24, 1999, at 3, at 1999 WL 24260595 (quoting city council candidate’s assertion
that “Houston’s geography and low-density population make [rail service] unfeasible”)
Bruce Nichols, Houston rail plan apparently heading nowhere, Dallas Morning News,
July 26, 1992, at 41A, at 1992 WL 7130570 (quoting then-mayor Bob Lanier’s statement
that “Houston is a difficult city in which to make rail work” due to Houston’s low
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Houston’s government-created low density effectively forces Houstonians into 
their cars, because densities of at least 7-15 dwelling units per acre are typically 
necessary to support significant public transit use.55  In areas with lower density, 
very few people will live within walking distance of a bus or train stop, which in turn 
means that very few people can conveniently use a bus or train.56   Indeed, Houston’s 
own politicians (including two former mayors) have repeatedly argued that Houston’s low 
density makes improved public transit impractical.57   By contrast, more compact 
density); Houston Divided on Rail Plan, Dallas Morning News, August 30, 1987, at 41A,
at 1987 WL 4622067 (then-mayor Kathy Whitmire stated that “she opposes building a
rail system now because Houston lacks the economic stability and population density to
support it”).  Houstonians ultimately rejected these arguments and chose to build a light
rail system.  See Lozano, supra note 6 (system began operation in 2004); 03 Year in
Review, Houston Chronicle, Dec. 28, 2003, at 9, 2003 WL 68831690 (In November
2003, “Houston voters approved a $7.5 billion referendum to extend rail service by 73
additional miles”) (“03 Year in Review”).
58Smart Growth Network: Getting to Smart Growth II: 100 More Policies For
Implementation 12 (2003) (available online at
www.smartgrowth.org/library/articles.asp?art=870)
59Some commentators suggest that the appropriate distance between houses and
neighborhood amenities should be about 1/4 mile, or a five-minute walk. See, e.g.,  Brian
W. Ohm & Robert J. Sitkowski, The Influence of New Urbanism on Local Ordinances:
The Twilight of Zoning?, 35 Urb. Law. 783, 784 (2003) (ordinances authorizing
pedestrian-friendly “new urbanist” style of development typically provide that
“neighborhood focal points, such as the neighborhood center, [be] within a five-minute
walking distance (or one-quarter mile) of the majority of residents”); Andres Duany &
Emily Talen, Making The Good Easy: The Smart Code Alternative, 29 Fordham Urb. L.
J. 1445, 1448 (2002) (“If urban areas were oriented around the mobility pattern of the
pedestrian, the neighborhood unit would be organized within a quarter mile radius and
would contain . . . structures that meet the essential daily needs of residents, such as
parks, schools and stores”). 
60Cf. Ohm & Sitkowski, supra note 59, at 792 (new urbanist developments “compact” -
that is, in such developments lot sizes are “smaller than allowed under conventional
zoning”).
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neighborhoods increase transportation choices because more people in an area means 
more potential riders within a short walking distance of a bus or train stop.58
In addition to reducing transit use, anti-density regulations reduce the overall 
walkability of a neighborhood.   In neighborhoods designed for pedestrians as well as 
motorized transportation,  the majority of the population lives within a short walk of the 
center of the neighborhood.59  If each house in the neighborhood must take 
up several thousand square feet, this goal cannot easily be met, because if a 
neighborhood’s houses are far apart, fewer houses can be placed within a five-minute 
walk of shops, jobs or each other.60  Thus, minimum lot size requirements reduce the 
61 See Michael B. Gerard, Trends & Insights, 15 Natural Resources & Environment 44, 46
(2000) (where government regulation prevents building in older cities, “new
developments are chased from the cities and into the automobile-dependent
hinterlands”); Bennett Roth, Transit Agenda, Houston Chronicle, October 1, 1990, at 9,
1990 WL 6620216 (in Houston’s newer areas, mass transit rare).
62 See TTI Study, supra note 28, Exhibit A-1 (population of Houston’s urbanized area
grew by 41% between 1982 and 2000).  
63 See Conserving, supra note 10, at 294 (pointing out that overregulation in urban core
encourages developers to build in “the place of least resistance, where 
opposing political pressures are absent or limited.  The most likely areas for this to occur
. . . will be those of small population, principally the more rural and outlying sections”,
thus causing “all the problems and detriments that come with ‘urban sprawl’”); Allan
Turner, High on Downtown, Houston Chronicle, October 27, 2000, at 1, 2000 WL
24520362 (“cheap suburban land” a cause of Houston’s sprawl and of downtown
Houston’s decline); John Williams, Downtown: Betting on the Future, Houston
Chronicle, October 12, 1997, at 6, 1997 WL 13071122 (Houston is a “city that has
always pushed toward cheap virgin land in the suburbs”). 
64 See Kapur, supra note 9, at 10054.
65 Houston Code, sec. 42-182(1).  
66 Id., secs. 42-1 and 42-101.
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number of people who can walk to errands or jobs.
Minimum lot size requirements and other anti-density regulations also encourage 
sprawl by encouraging population growth to shift away from Houston’s historic core to
newer areas (which are typically more thinly populated and automobile-dependent).61
When such rules restrict the number of homes that can be built in older, 
closer-in neighborhoods, builders must go someplace else to house Houston’s expanding 
population62 – and that someplace else is usually rural and suburban areas far from the 
urban core, because those areas have cheap real estate and few neighbors to object to 
development.63
In 1998,64 Houston narrowed the scope of its minimum lot size ordinance: the 
5000-square-foot minimum now applies only to “suburban” areas,65 defined as areas 
outside Interstate Highway 610,66 a highway which encircles, and is about five miles from, 
67 See Lettice Stuart, Developments Rebuild Area of Downtown Houston Into Living
Areas, The Journal Record, April 18, 1997,  at 1997 WL 14390575. 
68 Houston Code, sec. 42-183(a).  
69 Id., secs. 42-184 and 42-185. See also Kapur, supra note 9, at 10054 (describing 1998
law).  These ordinances are not specifically limited to townhouses.  However, Houston’s
1998 ordinance makes no explicit distinction between townhouses and detached houses,
Houston Code, sec. 42-1, and houses under 2000 square feet are frequently townhouses. 
See Non-Zoning, supra note 10, at 119 (noting that townhouses often take up 1300-1600
square feet of land). 
70 See U.S. Census Bureau, AmericanFactFinder, Quick Tables, Table QT-H7, Houston,
Texas,
http://www.factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=16000US4835000&
-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_QTH7&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U&-_lang=en&-red
oLog=false&-_sse=on (Visited Jan. 21, 2004).  In addition, 6.6% of city homes were
built before 1940, id., the year Houston enacted in subdivision ordinance.  See Non-
Zoning, supra note 10, at 73.
71
 See Bennett Roth, Urban and Suburban Houston, Houston Chronicle, July 7, 1991, at 1,
at 1991 WL 3928158 (only 408,000 of Houston’s then-1.6 million inhabitants lived
inside I-610 “Loop”); supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (noting that Loop is
boundary between “urban” and “suburban” zones under city law).
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downtown Houston.67  In “urban areas”, by contrast, the minimum lot size is now  
typically 3500 square feet.68  Houston’s government also allowed additional townhouse 
construction by allowing developers in urban areas to build on lots as small as 1400 
square feet, but diluted this concession by requiring builders of such units to provide 600 
feet of open space.69
But the 1998 ordinance has not yet dramatically increased density, for three 
reasons.  First, only 4,588 of Houston’s 329,006 owner-occupied housing units (about 
1.4% of city dwellings) were built in 1998 or thereafter.70  Second, only 25% of Houston 
residents live in the “urban” zone affected by the 1998 ordinance (that is, the area inside 
the I-610 highway, commonly known as the “Loop”).71   In other words, 75% of Houston 
homeowners live in homes that still must gobble up at least 5000 square feet of land under 
city law, and many of the other 25% live in homes that were covered by the 5000-square- 
72See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
73 Id., 42-234(a). 
74 U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, Table HCT32, Houston, Texas, Tenure By
Vehicles Available
(http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?_bm=y&-context=dt&-reg=DEC_2000_SF
4_U_HCT032:001&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF4_U&-CONTEXT=dt&-mt_name=DEC_
2000_SF4_U_HCT032&-tree_id=404&-all_geo_types=N&-geo_id=01000US&-geo_id=
16000US4835000&-search_results=16000US4835000&-format=&-_lang=en)  (visited
Jan. 21, 2004) (66,916 of 389,225 renters have no car).  
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foot rule when they were built.  Third, the 1400-square foot minimum lot size for 
townhouses, although less restrictive than prior law, is still more restrictive than laws of 
other North American cities (some of which allow townhouses as small as 390 square 
feet).72  Thus, townhouse developments may not be as compact in Houston as in other 
North American cities.  
So even after the 1998 reforms, Houston’s minimum lot size ordinance makes 
Houston more sprawling by preventing the free market from responding to consumers’ 
possible demand for compact development.
B. Minimum Parking Requirements and Setbacks: Houston’s One-Two Punch
Against Pedestrians
Virtually every structure built in Houston must, under municipal law,  have 
an ample supply of parking.  For example:
*Apartment buildings must provide 1.25 parking spaces for each efficiency
apartment, and 1.33 parking spaces for each 1 bedroom apartment.73  So even
though 17% of Houston renters do not even own one car,74 landlords must supply
more than one parking space for every tenant. 
*Single-family homes must be on lots large enough to “[e]nsure that two vehicles
75
 Houston Code, sec. 42-180(4). 
76 Houston Code, secs. 26-21 (requiring 2.5 parking spaces per 1000 square feet of GFA
or 2.75 per 1000 square feet of UFA); 26-2 (clarifying abbreviations by defining “GFA”
as “gross floor area” and “UFA” as “usable floor area” – that is, “the gross floor area of a
structure excluding lobbies, hallways, restrooms, elevators, stairwells, mechanical shaft
or vertical penetrations, atriums, mechanical rooms and service rooms.”)
77 Id.
78 Id. 
79 Id.
80 See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (“Drunk drivers
cause an annual death toll of over 25,000 and in the same time span cause nearly one
million personal injuries and more than five billion dollars in property damage." (citation
omitted).
81 Houston Code, sec. 26-21.
82 See Houston Code, sec. 42-1 (defining “building line requirement” as “minimum
required distance from an easement or a property line adjacent to a street or private street
in which no improvements requiring a building permit can be constructed on the
property”); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 608, 609 (1927) (“set-back requirement” was
ordinance requiring landowner to “set his building back from the street line of his lot”).
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per dwelling unit can be parked entirely on the lot.”75
*Office buildings must provide 2.5-2.75 parking spaces for every 1000 square feet
of floor area.76
*Hospitals must provide 2.2 spaces for each bed.77
*Supermarkets must provide 5 spaces per 1000 square feet of gross floor area.78
*Shopping centers must provide 4-5 spaces (depending on their size) per 1000
square feet of gross floor area.79
*Despite the well-known dangers of drunk driving,80 Houston bars must 
accommodate drinking drivers by providing 10 parking spaces per every 1000 feet of 
gross floor area.81
Thanks to Houston’s  “building line” or “setback” requirements,82 Houston’s sea 
83 See Julie Mason, Urban Reviewal, Houston Chronicle, August 18, 1997, 1997 WL
13057147 (because Houston law “generally requires a building to be set back at least 25
feet from the street or sidewalk . . . most shopping centers and restaurants are designed
with parking out front, creating a strip mall effect”);  James Howard Kunstler, Home
from Nowhere 138 (1996) (setback laws generally “keep buildings far away from the
street in order to create parking lots all around the building”).  Cf. Freilich, supra note 55,
at 554 (where setbacks reduced and buildings closer to street, parking lots typically in
rear of buildings).  I note that even if no setback rules existed, most Houston parking lots
would typically be aboveground because aboveground parking is cheaper than
underground parking. See Donald C. Shoup, The Trouble With Minimum Parking
Requirements, at http://vtpi.org/shoup.htm (visited June 4, 2003) (aboveground parking
costs builders $10,000 per space, while underground parking can cost as much as
$25,000 per space).  
84A “major thoroughfare” is a street designated as such in a “major thoroughfare and
freeway plan” approved by the Houston city council.  Id., sec. 42-1.
85 Houston Code, sec. 42-150(b) (explaining that city’s setback requirements “are
minimum standards”).
86 Houston Code, sec. 42-152. See also id., sec. 42-157 (25 foot setback rule applies to
some houses). The city allows smaller setbacks for buildings in downtown Houston, id.,
sec. 42-151(a), for commercial buildings not on major thoroughfares, Houston Code, sec.
42-151(c) and for commercial buildings on major thoroughfares if they are (1) within the
city’s urban area, and (2) on a street with less than an 80-foot right of way.  Id., sec. 42-
155.  Because  major streets generally have a 100-foot right of way, id., sec. 42-122, the
latter exemption is quite narrow, and most buildings on major streets must still have a 25-
foot setback.  Cf. Mike Snyder, New concept promoted for city planning, Houston
Chronicle, February 21, 2003, at 25, at 2003 WL 3239264 (“all of Main Street except the
downtown segment falls under a city rule requiring buildings be set back 25 feet from the
street.”) Moreover, the setback amendments do not affect the minimum parking
requirements discussed above.  See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
87See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
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of government-mandated parking is usually in front of most buildings.83  Houston’s city 
code generally requires that structures abutting major thoroughfares84 be at least85
25 feet from the street.86  Because parking lots are a common use for land that cannot be 
used for buildings,87 this ordinance effectively requires that a pedestrian walking into an 
apartment building, office or store must walk through at least 25 feet of parking first.        
Houston’s combination of mandatory setbacks and mandatory off-street parking 
makes Houstonians more automobile-dependent, for three reasons.  First, Houston’s
88 See Freilich, supra note 55, at 557 (“large expanses of asphalt devoted to parking often
discourage pedestrian mobility” and make public transit inconvenient by impeding
walking to and from transit stations); Douglas G. French, Cities Without Soul: Standards
for Architectural Controls with Growth Management Objectives, 71 U. Det. Mercy L.
Rev. 267, 280 (1994) (“Parking lots are inconvenient and inhospitable to pedestrians”).
89See Gregory Smith, Two buildings face wrecking ball for more parking space,
Providence Journal, November 4, 2002, at B1, 2002 WL 22528319 (parking lots “force
pedestrians to dodge vehicles crossing the sidewalk”).
90Reid Ewing, Pedestrian- and Transit-Friendly Design, A Primer for Smart Growth 10,
http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/pdf/ptfd_primer.pdf (visited June 12, 2003) (emphases
added).   See also French, supra note 88, at 278 (noting that one city imposes maximum
setback of 5 feet for commercial buildings in order “to promote small-town sociability”). 
91 Ewing, supra note 90, at 10.  See also Transportation and Growth Management
Program, Main Street . . .when a highway runs through it: A Handbook for Oregon
Communities 68 (1999)  www.lcd.state.or.us/tgm/publications.htm (Visited Feb. 17,
2004)  (“Main Street”) (“Setting buildings back or allowing parking between the building
entrance and sidewalk creates . . . a `no man’s land’ with little visual interest”); Amy
Sutherland, Push For “New Urbanism”, Portland Press Herald, Jan. 1, 1998, at 1A, 1998
WL 2479621 (setbacks cause streets to seem “vast” and “unfriendly looking”); Smith,
supra note 89 (parking lots “unsightly”).
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ocean of parking lots discourages walking.  Parking lots in front of buildings lengthen 
pedestrians’ commutes by increasing the distance between streets and destinations such as 
offices and shops,88 and may even endanger pedestrians by forcing them to reach buildings 
by walking through driveways and parking lots which they must share with cars.89  Even if 
Houston’s parking lots created no tangible danger or inconvenience for pedestrians, off-
street parking would still discourage walking by creating landscapes which are visually 
unappealing for pedestrians.  An Environmental Protection Agency report states that 
where buildings are set back behind yards of parking rather than being “flush with the 
sidewalk,”90 a pedestrian “has less to look at [and] feels more isolated.”91  By contrast, 
“small setbacks and shopfront windows provide more interesting scenery for pedestrians 
and create a feeling of connection between the buildings and the public spaces bordering 
92 French, supra note 88, at 280.
93
 See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. 
94 And if minimum parking requirements are calculated on a “per unit” basis (e.g. X
parking spaces for each apartment, hotel room or store), developers may be tempted to
reduce density still further by building fewer but larger structures in order to install fewer
parking spaces.  For example, if a developer is forced by municipal law to supply one
parking space per apartment, he will be forced to install fewer parking spaces if he builds
100 1000 square-foot apartments than if he builds 125 800 square-foot apartments.   See
Shoup, supra note 83.  Houston’s regulations governing parking for apartments are on a
“per unit” basis, and thus reduce density in this respect.  See supra note 73 and
accompanying text (describing Houston ordinances that require a set number of parking
spaces per apartment).   
95 See Donald C. Shoup, An opportunity to reduce minimum parking requirements, 61 J.
Am. Plan. Ass’n 14, 24 at 1995 WL 12344755 (1995). 
96 See Houston Code, sec. 26-21. 
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them.”92
Second, minimum parking requirements and setback laws reduce the density of 
population (when applied to apartment buildings) and jobs (when applied to businesses) – 
which in turn makes Houstonians more automobile-dependent, because, as noted above, 
low-density areas tend to be highly automobile-dependent.93  When land is devoted to 
parking, it is not available for housing, offices, shops or other uses.  Thus, a developer 
cannot build as many apartments, offices or stores in an area with minimum parking 
requirements and setback laws as he or she could build in the absence of government 
regulation.94 A case study from Oakland, California, shows how minimum parking 
requirements can reduce density.  In 1961, Oakland enacted an ordinance requiring 
apartment houses to provide one off-street parking space per dwelling unit for all 
apartments developed after that date95 – a requirement less onerous than that of Houston, 
which requires more than one parking space per apartment even for the smallest 
apartments.96  As a result of Oakland’s parking law, the number of units per acre in new 
97
 See Shoup, supra note 95, at 24-25.
98I note that the setback law, standing alone, would encourage businesses to create off-
street parking in front of buildings even if no minimum parking requirements existed.  If
no setback law existed, businesses could place buildings, lawns or parking lots in the 25
feet of their property closest to the street.  Houston’s setback law eliminates the first of
these options, thus increasing the chances that a parking lot will be installed. 
99 See Richard W. Wilson, Suburban parking requirements: a tacit policy for automobile
use and sprawl, 61 J. Am. Planning Ass’n  29, 34 (1995) at 1995 WL 12344761
(explaining effect of minimum parking laws upon parking supply); Shoup, supra note 95,
at 15 (93% of Houston-area commuters park for free). 
100
 See Shoup, supra note 83.
101
 See Shoup, supra note 95, at 24-25 (“Minimum parking requirements can make
parking appear free, but the cost does not disappear; rather, it reappears as higher costs
for all other goods and services”; for example, when Oakland, California instituted
minimum parking requirements, construction costs rose by 18% per dwelling).
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apartment buildings fell by 30%.97
Third, Houston’s parking and setback laws98 encourage developers to provide 
motorists with free parking, which in turn encourages driving.  When builders are forced 
by a city government to provide more parking than a free market would create, the total 
supply of parking spots increases, which in turn drives the market price of parking down- 
often to zero.99  In reality, such “free” parking is of course not free, because landowners 
must spend at least $10,000 for each parking space (including the loss of rent that 
landowners could have charged for the land in the absence of minimum parking 
requirements).100   In turn, landowners pass at least some of the cost of parking on to 
society as a whole through higher prices for goods and services.101  It follows that 
minimum parking requirements constitute a government-mandated transfer of wealth from
nondrivers to drivers, and thus encourage driving and discourage other forms 
of commuting.   
In sum, Houston’s parking and setback laws inconvenience pedestrians to forcing 
102 See Houston Code, sec. 42-123 (listing numerous streets not subject to street width
rules, and providing that streets in central business district not subject to such rules).
103A “major thoroughfare” is a street designated as such in a “major thoroughfare and
freeway plan” approved by the city council.  Id., sec. 42-1.
104 Id., sec. 42-122.
105 Id. (collector street, defined as streets distributing traffic between major thoroughfares
and other streets, must have 60 feet right-of-way or 50 feet right-of-way if “both sides of
the collector street consist of single-family residential lots that do not have driveway
access to the collector street”; all other streets must be 50 feet right-of-way if “adjacent to
exclusively single-family residential lots” and 60 feet right-of-way otherwise).
106 See Ralph Bivens, New Urbanism walks away from automobiles, Houston Chronicle,
May 18, 2003, at 8, at 2003 WL 3260023 (in one new Houston subdivision, “sidewalks
are 5 feet wide instead of the typical 4 feet”) (emphasis added).
107 See Melanie Markley, Walking at their own risk, Houston Chronicle, August 23, 2002,
at 27, at 2002 WL 2321824 (Many Houston schoolchildren “have to cross busy four-lane
streets and walk along roads that have no sidewalks”); See John I. Gilderbloom, Creating
the Accessible City, at
http://www.louisville.edu/org/sun/housing/cd_2/Bookarticles/Ch1.htm (visited Feb. 10,
2004) (60% of disabled and elderly persons who do live near bus stop do not have
sidewalks between residence and bus stop).
108
 See Dan Feldstein, High-style, wide and handsome, Houston Chronicle, June 12, 1998,
at 28, at 1998 WL 3582858 (Main Street in downtown Houston is 90 feet wide, and
Texas Avenue is 100 feet wide). 
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them to walk through parking lots to reach businesses and other destinations, make 
Houston more sprawling and automobile-dependent by reducing density, and subsidize 
driving by encouraging landowners to install free parking.
C.      Wide Streets
The Houston city code provides, subject to certain exceptions,102 that major
thoroughfares103 must have a 100 feet right-of-way,104 and all other streets must generally
have 50-60 feet rights-of-way.105 Because Houston sidewalks are typically either 4 feet
wide106 or are nonexistent,107 the practical result of this ordinance is that some of
Houston’s major streets are 90 or 100 feet wide,108 while other streets can be up to 60 feet
109 See Richard Colby, How Narrow A Street is Safe, Officials Ask, Portland Oregonian,
August 21, 2000, at D2, at 2000 WL 5425753 (“Since World War II, the customary
width for residential streets has been 32 to 36 feet”); Peter Swift, Residential Street
Typology and Injury Accident Frequency, at
http://www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/articles/narrow.asp (visited June 27, 2003); Alan B.
Coden, Narrow Streets Database, at http://www.sonic.net/abcaia/narrow.htm (visited
June 27, 2003) (“the typical local street has grown to a width of 36’”).
110See Creating Quality Places, Cast Study of I’On Village, at
http://qualityplaces.marc.org/4a_studies.cfm?Case=38 (Visited Jan. 28, 2004) (describing
new development in South Carolina) (“Quality Places”).
111
 See Victoria Transport Policy Institute, Traffic Calming Benefits, Costs and Equity
Impacts 3, at www.vtpi.org/calming.pdf (visited July 2, 2003) (“Traffic Calming”)
(listing various municipalities’ street widths, and noting that Portland allows 20-foot
streets in lower-density areas).  In fact, one new development in Columbia, South
Carolina has streets that are only 14 feet wide.  See Mike Ramsey, Neo-traditional trend
catches on, The State, August 19, 2002, at 1, at 2002 WL 23324909.  Cf. Coden, supra
note 109 (before World War II, most neighborhood streets 28-30 feet wide). 
112Only six of America’s metropolitan areas (Orlando, Tampa, West Palm Beach,
Memphis, Jacksonville, and Miami) have higher pedestrian fatality rates than Houston. 
See Surface Transportation Policy Project, Mean Streets 2002 at 8
(http://transact.org/report.asp?id=202) (Houston has seventh highest “Pedestrian Danger
Index” in nation; rankings based on average yearly pedestrian fatalities per capita,
adjusted for frequency of walking as measured by share of workers walking to work). 
113 Donovan v. Jones, 658 So.2d 755, 765 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting expert testimony). 
See also Freilich, supra note 59, at 557 (narrower streets easier for pedestrians to cross).
114 See Stephen H. Burrington, Restoring the Rule of Law and Respect for Communities
in Transportation, 5 N.Y.U. Env. L.J. 691, 701, 725 (1996) (blaming “larger roads” on
“solicitude for fast traffic” and asserting that “narrowed lanes” slow traffic); Thomas
Hylton, Put it in park, Sunday Patriot-News, March 16, 2003, at D1, at 2003 WL
3193226 (“wide streets encourage speeding” and indeed goal of adding lanes was to
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wide.  By contrast, most American streets are 32 to 36 feet wide,109 and some
municipalities allow commercial streets as narrow as 30 feet wide110 and residential streets
as narrow as 18 or 20 feet wide.111
Houston’s wide streets are difficult (and perhaps even dangerous)112 for
pedestrians to cross, because “a wider roadway takes longer to cross thus increasing the
amount of time the pedestrian is exposed to traffic.”113  Wide streets may also endanger
pedestrians by encouraging motorists to drive faster,114 thus increasing the number and
“speed traffic flow”). 
115 Burrington, supra note 114, at 704 n. 50.
116
 Id.  For example, one study of police accident reports showed that 36-foot streets had
1.21 accidents per mile per year, while 24-foot streets had 0.32 accidents per mile-year. 
Swift, supra note 109.  See also Traffic Calming, supra note 111, at 7 (“Each 1-mph
traffic speed reduction typically reduces vehicle collisions by 5%”).
117 See Burrington, supra note 114, at 704.  See also Traffic Calming, supra note 111, at 7;
Andy Hamilton, Driving pedestrians into extinction, San Diego Union-Tribune, June 1,
2001, at B9, 2001 WL 6463882 (citing similar statistics).  
118Cf. supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (explaining that regulations requiring use
of land for parking and setbacks reduces land available for housing and jobs, thus
reducing population and employment density and thereby fostering automobile
dependence). 
119 See Michelle Derus, Zoning can curb lower-cost housing, Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel,
Sept. 21, 1997, at 1, 1997 WL 12748753. 
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severity of accidents.  A motorist driving at high speeds has difficulty noticing the
surrounding environment; a motorist driving 30 miles per hour has a field of vision
spanning approximately 150 degrees, while a motorist driving 60 miles per hour has a
field of vision of only 50 degrees.115  Thus, the faster driver may have difficulty
perceiving that a pedestrian is crossing the street, and may be unable to slow down in time
to avoid an accident once he or she notices the pedestrian.116 And car crashes are more
lethal as cars go faster: the probability of a pedestrian being killed by an automobile is
only 3.5% when the auto is traveling at 15 miles per hour, increases to 37% if the auto is
traveling 31 miles per hour, and jumps to 83% if the auto is traveling 44 miles per hour.117
And by taking up street space, wide streets reduce the amount of land available for
housing and commerce, thus reducing residential and employment density, thus increasing
automobile dependence.118 A University of Wisconsin study showed that in one Wisconsin
county, each 10 feet of required street width reduced the county’s housing supply by 3 to 4
percent.119
120 Houston Code, sec. 42-127(b). 
121
 Ewing, supra note 90, at 4.  (NOTE to editor: Street Map Table on page 4 may look
good in article).  See also Main Street, supra note 91, at 35 (suggesting 200-400 foot
blocks).
122 Id. (“Short blocks are desirable because . . . pedestrians have frequent opportunities to
cross streets”); Ewing, supra note 90, at 4 (“more intersections mean more places where
cars must stop and pedestrians can cross”).
123 Id. Shorter blocks also benefit motorists by giving them more side streets to travel on,
which means that drivers have a wider range of options for driving and on-street parking. 
See Main Street, supra note 91, at 35.  And if drivers have more chances to park on the
street, there is less demand for off-street parking, and government has less reason to
enact minimum parking requirements.  See Part III-B and accompanying text (criticizing
such requirements). 
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In sum, Houston’s wide streets, like that city’s setbacks and minimum parking
requirements, make Houston less walkable and more auto-oriented - both by making
pedestrian journeys more difficult and dangerous, and by reducing density.
D. Long Blocks
The Houston city code provides that “intersections along a major thoroughfare 
shall be spaced a minimum of 600 feet apart.”120  By contrast, a federal report on
pedestrian-friendly design recommends that “[f]or a high degree of walkability, block
lengths of 300 feet, more or less, are desirable.”121
Houston’s long, intersection-free blocks deter walking in two ways.  First, a block
with few intersections gives pedestrians few places to safely cross the street.122  Second,
long blocks create less potential than shorter blocks for “direct routing”:123 that is, if
blocks are long, pedestrians cannot easily travel to parallel streets by taking a quick left or
right turn on a side street to their destination, but instead must go out of their way to visit
the end of a block, then turn onto the parallel street, then backtrack to reach their
destination.
124 See Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1047, 1091 (1996)
(“virtually all” current zoning laws “mandate the separation of different areas by
function”). 
125 See Terry J. Tondro, Sprawl and Its Enemies: An Introductory Discussion of Two
Cities’ Efforts to Control Sprawl, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 511, 514 (2001) (“single use zoning”
is “the designation of separate land areas for different uses”).
126 See Not Just Environmental, supra note 8, at 331 (“absent a zoning variance, walkable
traditional neighborhoods are [often] outlawed . . . because every activity demands a
separate zone of its own; people cannot live within walking distance of shopping, and
offices cannot be within walking distance of either”) (citation omitted).
127 Tondro, supra note 125, at 517.  Cf. Non-Zoning, supra note 10, at 90 (pointing out
that separation of uses harmful to persons without automobiles, because “for the family
that does not own an automobile, the existence of a nearby grocery store . . . may be a
great convenience.”). 
128 See Infirmities, supra note 5, at 735 (“No laws prohibit the erection of buildings
containing both residential and commercial uses.”)
129 Houston Code, sec. 42-189(b).  
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E.       Enforcing Separation of Uses
On first glance, Houston’s laws governing separation of land uses appear to be less
restrictive than those of other American cities.  Many American cities prohibit the creation
of businesses or shops in residential zones, and vice versa.124  Such “single use zoning”125
often prevents houses and apartments from being within walking distance of employers or
shops, thus preventing Americans from walking to jobs or shops,126 in turn creating cities
in which “[v]ery few people can simply walk to the local grocer . . . Even if you are going
to purchase a single item and the store is very close by, it is normally a car trip away.”127
By contrast, Houston has no zoning code explicitly prohibiting the mixing of
residential and commercial uses,128 with the exception of an ordinance prohibiting single-
family residences from being located on major thoroughfares.129 Instead, Houstonians
separate homes from businesses through restrictive covenants that specify the appropriate
use for each lot in a subdivision, and enable every lot owner to sue in the event of a
130See Infirmities, supra note 5, at 742.
131Id.
132See Kapur, supra note 9, at 10049 (discussing city support of covenants).   I note,
however, that even in other cities, restrictive covenants are widespread because federal
officials have encouraged their creation. See Non-Zoning, supra note 10, at 80 (Federal
Housing Adminstration recommends restrictive covenants even in areas with zoning).  
Cf. Florence Wagman Roisman, Teaching About Inequality, Race and Property, 46 St. L.
U. L.J. 665, 678-79 (2002) (in 1930s and 1940s, Federal Housing Administration
encouraged covenants that barred African-Americans from neighborhoods)
133Id. (“a municipality that is not a party to restrictive covenants generally may not
enforce them”).  See also Shibata, supra note 9, at 232-33.
134 Houston Code, sec. 10-443. 
135 Houston Code, sec. 10-552(a) (listing penalties) and 553(b) (authorizing city attorney
to seek such penalties).
136See Kapur, supra note 9, at 10050 (noting that city bears expenses of litigation).
Houston also refuses to issue building permits to structures that violate restrictive
covenants, Houston Code, sec. 10-3(a), and encourages covenant creation by allowing
covenants to be created by a mere majority vote of subdivision residents.  See Kapur,
supra note 9, at 10050 n. 89.  But Houston law is not quite unique in the latter respect: in
many states, courts hold that if a common scheme of development is embodied in the
majority of subdivision residents’ deeds, this scheme is enforeceable against individual
landowners whose deeds do not contain such covenants.  See John G. Sprankling,
Understanding Property Law, sec. 34.05[B] (2000).    
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violation.130  Because such covenants are created by contract rather than by government
officials, it could be argued that to the extent residential and commercial uses are
segregated in Houston, such segregation is a result of the free market.131
But in Houston, restrictive covenants are so heavily facilitated by government
involvement that they resemble zoning regulation almost as much as they resemble
traditional contracts.132  Houston’s city code, unlike that of most American cities,133 allows
the city attorney to sue to enforce restrictive covenants.134 The city may seek civil
penalties of up to $1000 per day for violation of a covenant.135  Thus, Houston forces its
taxpayers to subsidize enforcement of restrictive covenants136 even when litigation is too
137
 See Infirmities, supra note 5, at 744 (city enforces covenants because “enforcement of
restrictive covenants can be costly for homeowners”).
138 Shibata, supra note 9, at 234.
139 See Infirmities, supra note 5, at 742 (mix of uses not overly common in Houston);
Smart Growth America, The Sprawl Index: Houston, Texas,
http://smartgrowthamerica.org/sprawlindex/factsheet_houston.html (visited June 12,
2003) (Houston has 52nd lowest level of mixed use out of 83 metropolitan areas studied;
thus, residences, jobs and services more mixed in 30 other metro areas than in Houston);
Reid Ewing, Rolf Pendall & Don Chen, Measuring Sprawl and Its Impact 20-22,  
http://smartgrowthamerica.org/sprawlindex/MeasuringSprawl.PDF, (visited June 12,
2003) (describing methodology in calculating amount of mixed use within metro areas). 
140Snyder, supra note 22 (quoting head of Houston chapter of American Institute of
Architects).
141See Laura Johannes, Funding Hurts Houston Plan for Highways, Wall Street Journal,
Sept. 20, 1995 at T1, 1995 WL-WSJ 9900569 (describing city’s lobbying for state
highway funds); John Williams, Influential PAC Considers Disbanding, Houston
Chronicle, November 17, 1994, at 29, 1994 WL 4602953 (describing city’s efforts to
obtain state and federal support). 
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costly for individuals to pursue.137  In its covenant litigation, the city has focused on
enforcement of use restrictions (that is, covenant provisions requiring separation of uses),
as opposed to enforcement of other restrictions such as aesthetic rules.138  By subsidizing
enforcement of use restrictions, Houston’s city government subsidizes segregation of land
uses - and in fact, land uses in Houston are only slightly less segregated than in most cities
with zoning codes.139  As a result, many Houstonians must, in the words of one local
architect, “drive for 10 minutes just to get a quart of milk.”140
F. A Note On Spending (Or, How Houston’s Highways Have Accelerated
Sprawl)
In addition to enacting anti-density land use regulations and mandating anti-
pedestrian street design, Houston’s government has also spent its way to sprawl.  
Houston’s city government has, with ample state and federal support,141 built numerous
expressways leading to the city’s suburbs and newer areas.  While most cities have one
142Loopy Loop: Say no to a second beltway, Star Tribune, February 24, 2003, at 12A, 
2003 WL 5529459.  A beltway is a circular freeway system surrounding a city.  See L.
Ling-chi Wang, Political Mobilization or Donations in American Democracy?  The
Dilemma of Asian-American Political Participation, 8 Asian Pac. Am. L. J. 100, 106 n.
19 (2002). 
143See Mike Snyder, Buffalo Bayou Master Plan, Houston Chronicle, July 4, 2001, at 35,
2001 WL 23612340 (third beltway, known as “Grand Parkway”, planned); Rad Sallee,
Road’s Hazards, Houston Chronicle, August 13, 2000, at 37, 2000 WL 24504123
(portions of Grand Parkway already built). 
144TTI Study, supra note 28, Exhibit A-1 (tables for individual regions show that Houston
urbanized area has 3.4 million inhabitants to Boston urbanized area’s 3.0 million). 
145Id. 
146Id.(Chicago urbanized area has just over 8 million residents, as opposed to Houston’s
3.4 million).
147Id. 
148Id., Exhibits A-4, A-8, and A-10 (Houstonians lose more hours, dollars and fuel per
person to congestion than residents of Boston and Chicago areas). 
149See Lucas Wall, Rail Vote Nov. 4, Houston Chronicle, October 26, 2003, at 29, 2003
WL 57452613.  I note that because the Houston area now has 20,181 miles of roadways,
this plan would increase the size of the roadway system by over 50%.  Id. 
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circular highway (or beltway) surrounding them, Houston has two142 and may soon build a
third.143  And Houston has more overall freeway mileage than other American regions of
comparable size.   For example, the Houston urbanized area is only about 10% more
populous than the Boston urbanized area144 - yet Houston has almost twice as many lane-
miles of freeway (2460 to Boston’s 1310).145   Similarly, the Houston region is less than
half as populous as Chicago and its suburbs146- yet Houston has almost as many freeway
miles (2460 to Chicago’s 2655).147  Yet Houston’s roads are more congested than those of
Chicago or Boston.148
And more of the same may be coming.  The Houston-Galveston Area Council, the
region’s transportation planning agency, recently proposed to build 10,703 lane miles of
roads, at a cost of $21.1 billion149 (not counting the costs of purchasing right-of-way from
150Id.
151Id.  The region’s $11 billion plan requires the creation of 5,644 miles of new roadway. 
Id.  See also Matt Schwartz, County considers major additions to area tollways, Housotn
Chronicle, June 3, 2003 at 1, 2003 WL 3264078 (describing numerous new roads being
considered by local government).
152Harris County includes Houston, and most of the county’s population lives in the city
of Houston.  See McGeveran, supra note 51, at 459 (Harris County includes Houston and
has just over 3.4 million people), 439 (Houston’s population is just over 1.9 million). 
153See Dave Schafer, Westgreen expansion concerns residents, Houston Chronicle, Nov.
13, 2001, at 1, 2003 WL 68824602.
154Id. 
155Id. 
156See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text (describing adverse impact of wide,
fast streets upon pedestrians).
157See Stumbling Block, supra note 3, at 1048-51; Oliver Gillham, The Limitless City 36
(2002) (highways “improved access between city and suburb, making it easier to
commute to ever more distant outlying areas.”)
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private landowners).150   Even if Houston-area governments are unable to raise taxes to
support this plan, they will be able to spend $11.5 billion on roads.151  And Houston’s road
spending includes plans to make its already-wide surface streets even wider: for example,
the Texas Department of Transportation and Houston’s county government152 are busy
turning Wintergreen, a residential street in Houston, into a major thoroughfare by adding
entrance and exit ramps to a nearby ten-lane freeway, as well as a freeway overpass.153
The neighborhood’s stop signs will be removed to accommodate the additional traffic - a
result that, according to one resident, “will create a race track.”154  If this prediction is
correct, Westgreen (a street now used by neighborhood children walking to school)155 will
become an extremely unpleasant environment for pedestrians.156
As a general rule, expressways make it easier for people to move from
neighborhoods near a city’s central business district to newer, more suburb-like areas.157
158Id. at 5 (each of the United States’s ten largest cities, including Houston, are at least
five times as densely populated as their entire metropolitan areas). 
159Id. at 7.
160See Stumbling Block, supra note 3, at 1041 (noting that in many small towns and
suburbs, “auto ownership is virtually necessary for a normal life”) and n. 24 (citing
numerous cases pointing out that auto ownership necessity in suburbs).  
161See Jerome G. Rose, Regulating the Use of Land Abutting State Highways: New
Jersey’s State Highway Access Management Act, 18 R.E.L.J. 288, 288 (1990) (in
Houston, as elsewhere, there has been “[e]xtensive development along the highways”);
Houston Freeways: A Historical and Visual Journey,
http://www.houstonfreeways.com/preview_ch5.aspx (Jan. 28, 2004) (area near west edge
of I-610 Loop became major “edge city” after that portion of Loop completed in 1968). 
162See David Kaplan, Houston Homes, Houston Chronicle, April 8, 2001 at 1, 2001 WL
3011845.
163See Gillham, supra note 157, at 5 (Houston’s suburbs less dense than central city).
164See Roth, supra note 61 (Houston suburbs have minimal transit service); Lucas Wall,
Rail Vote Nov. 4, Houston Chronicle, September 19, 2003, at 1, 2003 WL 5744162
(Houston’s light rail system does not serve areas outside I-610 Loop).
165See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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The latter areas typically have low population densities158 and minimal transit service,159
and are therefore inaccessible without a car.160  Thus, highways shift development from
relatively dense downtowns to more automobile-dependent areas on the city’s fringe. 
The same pattern has evolved in Houston.   In Houston, as elsewhere, highways
have shifted development to areas near or outside Houston’s beltways.161  By contrast,
Houston’s older neighborhoods lost population for most of the second half of the 20th
century.162 And in Houston, as in other cities, newer, highway-created areas tend to be
more thinly populated163 and to have less transit service than older neighborhoods closer
to downtown.164   In fact, Houston’s city code now mandates that housing densities be
lower in areas outside the city’s I-610 Loop than in neighborhoods closer to downtown
Houston.165   So by shifting development outside the Loop, Houston’s highway spending
makes Houston less compact and more automobile-dependent. 
166See, e.g., David Kaplan, Walking Against the Crowd, Houston Chronicle, Oct. 26,
2003, at 1, 2003 WL 57452578 (some residents of Houston’s Midtown neighborhood
“want a walkable mix of retail and residential . . . but are up against the suburban car
culture that dominates Houston”); Lucas Wall, 2003 Voter’s Guide: Metro Referendum,
Houston Chronicle, October 26, 2003, at 3, 2003 WL 57452731 (opponents of light rail
expansion argue that ‘few people will ride light rail . . . because Houstonians love their
cars”).
167The 1002 registered voters surveyed were actually less likely to use public transit than
the Houston electorate as a whole: 3% of them used public transit to get to work, as
opposed to 5.9% of all Houston commuters.  See Summary of Responses, Blueprint
Houston Survey of Registered Voters in the City of Houston: May 2003, at
http://www.blueprinthouston.org/documents/blueprint_survey_results.doc (visited Feb. 8,
2004) (Question 31) (“Summary of Responses”); Wall, supra note 29 (5.9% of
Houstonians commute to work via public transit). 
168Summary of Responses, supra note 167 (Question 10).
169Id. The remaining respondents were undecided.
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H. Does Government Matter?
It could be argued that government’s contribution to Houston’s sprawl is minimal
because Houston’s urban form arises out of Houston’s “car culture” - that is, from some
sort of regional consumer preference for vehicle-dependent lifestyles that may be more
important than government regulation or spending.166  This argument is essentially a faith-
based argument: that is, it is impossible to disprove, because there is no way of isolating
the impact of one specific government policy or set of policies upon Houston’s sprawl. 
However, poll data suggests that a significant number of Houstonians would prefer
a less vehicle-dependent lifestyle.  A May 2003 survey asked a representative167 sample of
Houstonians: “Would you personally prefer to live in a suburban setting with larger lots
and houses and a longer drive to work and most other places, or in a more central urban
setting with smaller homes on smaller lots, and be able to take transit to work or walk to
work and other places?”168  55% of survey respondents chose the “Central urban setting”
and only 37% chose the “Suburban setting.”169  It therefore appears that if more
170Id. (Question 11). 
171Id. (Question 8).  Poll respondents also favored expanded public transit.  75% favored
adding expanded bus service and 68% favored expanded rail transit.  Id. 
172Id. (Question 5). 
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pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods were available, Houstonians would flock to them. 
Other responses to the 2003 survey support this view.  When asked whether it was
“Very important”, “Somewhat important”, “Not very important” or “Not important at all”
to have schools and other services within walking distance of their homes, 46% of
Houstonians stated that it was “Very important” to have more services within walking
distance of home, and 25% stated that it was “Somewhat important.”170  Not surprisingly,
87% of Houstonians favored “Making it easier to walk in the city”.171
And when asked to describe various problems as “Very Great” concerns, “Great”
concerns, or as “Somewhat” or “Not at all” of a concern, 60% of Houstonians stated that it
was a “Very Great” or “Great” concern that “The city needs more and better sidewalks in
many areas”, and 49% described inadequate public transportation as a “Very Great” or
“Great” concern.172
In sum, most Houstonians would actually like to be able to walk or use public
transit to reach shops and jobs, rather than being forced into their cars.  It logically follows
that in Houston, there may be significant unmet demand for pedestrian- and transit-
friendly communities - which in turn means that if government regulation and spending
did not favor sprawl, a significant number of Houstonians might choose such
communities.   
IV. Is Houston’s Sprawl A Problem And If So, What Is To Be Done?
Even if Houston’s sprawl is caused by government regulation, it could be argued
173I concede that all of the problems discussed below would probably exist to some extent
if Houston was as compact and transit-friendly as other cities.  But the sheer scale of
Houston’s automobile dependency makes each of these problems worse.  For example, if
the average Houstonian drove 18.4 miles per day (the mileage traveled by the average
resident of metro Philadephia) instead of 37.6 miles per day, Houston’s streets would be
at least somewhat less congested and its air would be at least somewhat less polluted. 
See Highway Statistics, supra note 31 (listing mileage statistics for metropolitan areas).
174The costs listed below are not, of course, the only possible costs of sprawl.  See
Gillham, supra note 12, at 88-91 (sprawl may adversely affect farmland and wildlife),
115-18 (sprawl may adversely affect water quality and obesity); 131-32 (sprawl may
cause abandonment of cities).  But I have chosen to focus on sprawl-related harms that
are especially Houston-specific and/or especially easy to describe or statistically verify. 
Central city deterioration is not as large a problem in Houston as in other cities, because
Houston has managed to annex many of its suburban areas and thus gain population.  Id.
at 139-41. And I have found no evidence that environmental and public health problems
other than ozone pollution are more significant in Houston than in other cities.
175See Houston-Galveston Area Council, 2025 RTP Accessibility Summary 8-9, at
http://www.2025plan.org/info/info.html (Click on “Accessibility” link to find document)
(visited Feb. 10, 2004) (less than 30% of jobs transit-accessible) (“RTP”)
176See L.M. Sixel, “Living Wage” Push Resurrected at $10, Houston Chronicle, August
31, 2001, at 1, 2001 WL 23625182 (proposed local minimum wage for companies doing
business with city  “rounded up [by supporters] to reflect the fact that Houstonians need
cars”); Kyle W. Fake, HPD lists Houston’s most stolen vehicles, Houston Chronicle,
June 21, 2000, at 12, 2000 WL 4310910 (“One thing that is certain about living in
Houston is that you need a car or truck”); Clifford Pugh, Ten years after bottoming out in
the oil slump, Houston’s a changed town from A to Z, Houston Chronicle, August 24,
1997, at 6, 1997 WL 13058274 (“To get around in this sprawling city, you need a car.”)
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that it is (1) fundamentally harmless or (2) cannot feasibly be mitigated.   The discussion
below briefly outlines some of the costs of Houston’s sprawl and suggests alternative
policies.  
A. Why Bother To Change?  Or, The Costs of Sprawl
Houston’s sprawl has contributed to the imposition173 of a variety of costs upon
Houstonians, including:174
*Financial costs.  Because Houston is so sprawling and automobile-dominated,
most jobs are not near bus or rail stops,175 and most Houstonians must own cars176 and
177See Highway Statistics, supra note 31 and accompanying text (Houstonians drive more
than residents of other large cities).
178See Household Spending, supra note 32.
179Id. (only residents of Dallas-Fort Worth spend more). 
180Id.   It could be argued that Houston’s sprawl has contributed to its affordable housing
by increasing the supply of buildable land, thus offsetting Houstonians’ high
transportation costs.  See supra note 16 (noting debate over whether Houston
significantly less expensive than other cities); Eric Berger, HUD looks at Houston
housing, Houston Chronicle, April 30, 1998, at 33, 1998 WL 3574745 (Houston’s sprawl
“means people earning low wages might be able to find affordable housing”).  But the
average Houston household spends $24,157 on housing and transportation combined-
more than the average Bostonian, and more than residents of the majority of large
metropolitan areas.  See Household Spending, supra note 32 (11 of 28 metro areas spend
more on housing and transportation combined than Houston, while 16 spend less). 
181 Michael Lewyn, Sprawl, Growth Boundaries, and the Rehnquist Court, 2002 Utah L.
Rev. 1, 43 (2002) (“Boundaries”) (describing TTI).
182
 See TTI Study, supra note 28, at Exhibit A-4 (congestion statistics).  By this measure,
Houston has less traffic congestion than Los Angeles and San Francisco, but more than
the other seven regions with over 3 million people.  Id., Exhibit A-1 (listing regional
populations). 
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drive many miles177 to do their daily errands, which means that they must spent thousands
of dollars on cars, gasoline and other automobile-related goods and services. The average
household in Houston spends $9,566 per year on transportation,178 more than residents of
almost every other major metropolitan area,179 and over $3000 per year more than
residents of metropolitan Boston (the region with the lowest per-household transportation
costs).180
*Traffic congestion.  More driving means more cars on the streets, which means
more traffic congestion. According to a study by the Texas Transportation Institute, a state
research agency affiliated with Texas A & M University,181 Houstonians lost 37 hours per
person in 2001 to traffic congestion, more than commuters in seven of the nine
comparably sized (i.e. with over 3 million people) urban areas.182 Another measure of
congestion is gallons of fuel wasted per person: Houstonians wasted 59 gallons per
183
 Id., Exhibit A-10.  By this measure of congestion, the only regions more congested
than Houston were Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Dallas.  
184 Id., Exhibit A-8.  By this measure of congestion, the only regions more congested than
Houston were Los Angeles and San Francisco. 
185See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text (describing automobile dependency in
Houston).
186See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text. 
187See Tony Freemantle, Airing of Grievance, Houston Chronicle, May 1, 2002, at 21,
2002 WL 3259994.   Ozone is “a major respiratory irritant that some studies suggest may
cause ashtma.”  Id.   
188See Andy Summa, Fort Bend above the state average in passing vehicle emissions
tests, Houston Chronicle, June 12, 2003, at 1, 2003 WL 57420624 (in Houston, cars and
trucks produce 30 percent of nitrogen oxide fumes; these fumes in turn “react in sunlight
to form ground-level ozone”).
189See RTP, supra note 175. 
190See Dan Feldstein & Claudia Kolker, Carless in Houston, Houston Chronicle, June 15,
1997, at 1, 1997 WL 6562717 (in Harris County, which includes Houston, average
carless household earns $13,000 per year, less than one-third income of average county
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person, more than residents of all but three urbanized areas.183  A third measure of
congestion is monetary cost per person: Houstonians lost $710 per person as a result of
traffic congestion, again more than residents of all but two urban areas.184  So Houstonians
have the worst of both worlds: they often have to drive everywhere,185 but are stuck in
traffic once they get behind the wheel.186
*Air pollution.  Houston’s air is more polluted than that of all but a few American
cities, at least partially because of heavy automobile use.  A 2002 American Lung
Association report revealed that Houston had the fifth worst ozone air pollution in the
United States.187  30% of Houston’s ozone pollution comes from cars and trucks.188  So by
increasing automobile use, Houston’s vehicle-dependent urban form increases pollution. 
*The unquantifiable costs of isolating the neediest Houstonians from jobs and
civic amenities.  As noted above, most Houston-area jobs are not transit-accessible,189
which means that those Houstonians too poor,190 too elderly or too disabled191 to own cars
household); Patrick Gallagher, The Environmental, Social and Cultural Impacts of
Sprawl, 15 Natural Resources and Environment 219, 223 (2001) (generally, sprawl-
induced “relocation of jobs outside the urban core made them inaccessible to public
transit and further removed from the region’s poor and people of color”).
191See Gilderbloom, supra note 107 (pointing out that (1) majority of Houston’s elderly
and disabled do not live near a bus stop, and (2) that 60% of disabled and elderly persons
who do live near bus stop do not have sidewalks between residence and bus stop).
192See Not Just Environmental, supra note 8, at 364-65 (discussing possible relationship
between sprawl and welfare dependency).
193See supra note 176 (suggesting that this is the case for many Houstonians).
194See Not Just Environmental, supra note 8, at 347-50 (necessity of car ownership
reduces consumer choice).
195See Part III-H supra.
196
 See Bare, supra note 2, at 491 (“The political support for sprawl comes from lobbies
for transportation, real estate, and other business[es].  They push favorable legislation
through, using direct and indirect political influence, and are not likely to give up the
prosperity of their industries by supporting anti-sprawl initiatives.  Each of these
industries draw their profits from continued [suburban] development”).
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may be frozen out of jobs and other civic opportunities, which in turn may force some of
them out of the labor force and onto the welfare rolls.192
*The unquantifiable costs of the “coercion factor” - the practical necessity for the
car-owning middle classes to own cars and to use them often.193  To the extent this
“necessity” is created by government regulation, it reduces consumer choice, thus
reducing human freedom and impoverishing the lives of its supposed beneficiaries.194
Because Houston’s sprawl has contributed to several noxious problems, its citizens
should prune their city’s thicket of regulation in order to make Houston more free and less
sprawling.
B. Help Is On The Way 
As noted above,195 Houston public opinion supports policies designed to make
Houston less auto-dependent.  Similarly, the real estate industry (a bulwark of support for
pro-sprawl public policies in most cities and states)196 has come to support reform of
197 See Matt Schwartz, Revised subdivision ordinance sent to panel, Houston Chronicle,
Sept. 8, 1998, at 13, 1998 WL 16769072 (according to city planning director, “there was
broad support for [such] revisions among development and residential interests”).
198 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
199See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text (explaining how pre-1998 law prevented
townhouse construction by prohibiting construction of townhouses on less than 2250
square feet).  Neighborhoods outside the Loop are still governed by pre-1998 law.  See
supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
200See Chapter 42, supra note 54 (noting that 25 foot setback rule no longer applies to
commercial structures on major thoroughfares where the right of way is narrower than 80
feet); Houston Code, sec. 42-155 (discussing changes in detail, and adding that developer
must meet a variety of specified criteria to take advantage of this exception and must
build within city’s “urban area”). 
201Kaplan, supra note 162 (“townhouses have been popping up” in neighborhoods inside
the 610 Loop to house “Houstonians [who] are moving back toward the center of town”). 
202 Id. (noting population rise, and describing it as “noteworthy, considering that it had
been losing people from the `60s until the mid-‘90s”).
203
 Id. (“the value of land inside Loop 610 has risen 70 percent, and in some parts it has
increased much more.”)
204See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (noting limitations of 1998 reforms).
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Houston’s land use policies.  When the city rewrote its subdivision ordinance in the late
1990s, the city’s homebuilders urged the city to allow more compact development by
reducing lot sizes.197  And in 1998, the city did exactly that, reducing the minimum lot size
within the 610 Loop from 5,000 square feet to 3,500 square feet – and even to 1,400
square feet under certain circumstances198 (thus facilitating townhouse construction).199 In
addition, Houston modified its setback requirements by allowing setbacks of less than 25
feet under certain narrowly defined circumstances.200
The apparent results of these changes was what the real estate industry and anti-
sprawl activists hoped for: townhouses and small houses are popping up throughout
Houston’s inside-the-Loop neighborhoods,201 population inside the Loop is growing after
having decreased between 1960 and the mid-1990s,202 and the value of urban land rose by
70 percent in the late 1990s.203   Although Houston’s steps so far have been modest,204 they
205See supra notes 65-68, 198-99 and accompanying text.  I note that Houston’s recent
creation of a light rail system may also mitigate sprawl by making it easier for
Houstonians to get around without a car.  See supra note 57 (citing numerous articles on
light rail in Houston).
206Of course, Houstonians can also choose to try to reduce sprawl by increasing, rather
than reducing, government regulation or spending.  Houstonians have chosen to fight
sprawl by spending billions on expanded public transit, see supra note 57, while other
state and local governments have sought to address sprawl by enacting regulations
limiting suburban development and mandating more pedestrian-friendly development.
See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, Using Smart Growth to Achieve Sustainable Land Use
Policies, 32 ELR 11385, 11393-96 (1999) (discussing states’ attempts to encourage local
land use planning and protect farmland from development); Freilich, supra note 55, at
552-54, 57 (some cities have experimented with “transit-oriented development”
ordinances that “encourage or require minimum densities” in certain areas, “feature
maximum setback[s] . . . [to bring] buildings closer to the street”, and restrict off-street
parking in certain areas); Dwight H. Merriam and Gordon H. Buck, Smart Growth,
Dumb Takings, 25 ELR 10746, 10774 (1999) (describing various types of “urban growth
boundary” schemes designed to limit suburban development).  I have chosen not to
address the merits of such policies in this paper, for two reasons. First, the merits of using
government regulation to control sprawl have been addressed elsewhere in great detail. 
See, e.g., Clint Bolick, Subverting the American Dream: Government Dictated “Smart
Growth” is Unwise and Unconstitutional, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 859, 863-64, 868-71 (2000)
(raising policy and constitutional objections to anti-sprawl regulations); Infirmities, supra
note 5, at 698-732 (same); Wall, supra note 166 (discussing debate over light rail
expansion in Houston); Dowling, supra note 2, at 880-85 (defending anti-sprawl
regulations). Second, because Part III of this article focuses primarily on Houston’s
departures from laissez-faire principles rather than on its lack of zoning, a discussion of
how Houston could deregulate land use flows logically from Part III, while a discussion
of the pros and cons of anti-sprawl regulation would not be as closely related to Part III. 
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have not been useless.
C. Further Reforms: A New Vision For Houston
By reducing minimum lot sizes,205 Houstonians have already taken small steps
towards making Houston more walkable and less sprawling.  But Houston can do far more
to cut back on sprawl - and can do so in a way that builds upon, rather than reversing,
Houston’s traditional hostility towards zoning.206  Specifically, Houston can (1) eliminate
minimum lot size requirements, (2) scale back setback and minimum parking
207See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (describing anti-pedestrian side effects
of anti-density regulations).
208I note in passing that both the Texas and federal Supreme Courts have upheld the
constitutionality of minimum lot size requirements.  See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W. 2d 922 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1144 (1999).  Agins and Mayhew upheld regulations that were designed to protect rural
and suburban areas from urbanization.  See Agins, 447 U.S. at 261 n. 8; Mayhew, 964
S.W. 2d at 935.   But other courts have upheld minimum lot size requirements in urban
environments as well.  See Neuzil v. Iowa City, 451 N.W. 2d 159, 166 (Iowa 1990)
(upholding 8 lot per acre rule);  Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Arden H. Rathkopf, and Daren A.
Rathkopf, 3 Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning sec. 51.11 (4th ed. 2001) (courts
have generally upheld “modest lot-size requirements of 5,000 or 6,000 square feet”).
209See Schenck v. City of Hudson, 997 F. Supp. 902, 905 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (upholding
city zoning ordinance because city “has the right to limit the density of population to
prevent congestion”); City of Bellevue v. East Bellevue Community Council, 983 P.2d
602, 608 (Wash. 1999) (municipal government “had authority to conclude that of
possible densities, the lowest would be better given existing severe traffic congestion in
the area”); Neuzil, 451 N.W. 2d at 166.
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requirements, (3) stop encouraging separation of land uses, (4) stop widening roads and
building new freeways.
1. Minimum Lot Sizes
Rather than merely reducing the minimum lot size required for new developments
(as did Houston’s 1998 subdivision ordinance) Houston should completely delete
minimum lot size requirements from its municipal code.  If builders were allowed to build
more compact developments without government interference, they could place more
houses and townhouses near public transit, offices and shops, thus giving more
Houstonians the chance to live within walking distance of such amenities.207
A common justification208 for minimum lot size requirements and other anti-
density regulations is that such laws prevent the traffic congestion that comes from
packing more people (and thus more drivers) into smaller spaces.209  But Houston’s own
traffic problems suggest otherwise. As noted above, the Houston urbanized area has lower
210
 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
211See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text. 
212By these measures, Houston has less traffic congestion than Los Angeles and San
Francisco, but more than the other seven regions with over 3 million people.   See TTI
Study, supra note 28, Exhibits A-1 (listing regional populations), A-4 and A-8
(congestion statistics). 
213Id., Exhibit A-1.
214See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (showing link between low density and
automobile dependency).
215See supra notes 24-28, 31 and accompanying text
216Indeed, it could be argued that by increasing congestion, minimum lot size
requirements are irrational and thus unconstitutional.  Land use regulations (such as
minimum lot size ordinances) are generally facially invalid only if they are arbitrary.  See
Tri-Corp Management Co. v. Praznik, 33 Fed. Appx. 742, 747 (6th Cir. 2002)
(government regulation violates due process if it is “arbitrary and capricious”). Cf. ;
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (even a rational regulation may
violate Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment if it creates unusually harsh impact upon
individual landowner).  But to strike down minimum lot sizes as arbitrary,  courts would
have to overturn generations of precedent.  See supra notes 207-08 (courts generally
defer to anti-density municipal land regulation). 
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population density than almost every American region of comparable size.210  Yet Houston
actually has more traffic congestion than the majority of comparable regions: as noted
above,211 Houstonians lose more hours and dollars per person to congestion than
commuters in seven of the nine comparably sized (i.e. with over 3 million people) urban
areas212 - even though all nine are more densely populated than Houston.213   Because no
strong correlation exists between density and congestion, Houston’s anti-density
regulations have arguably failed to reduce traffic congestion.  
In fact, Houston’s anti-density rules may have increased congestion by increasing
driving: residents of low-density communities generally must drive more than other
Americans,214 and Houstonians in particular drive more miles daily than residents of more
densely populated regions.215  So by increasing driving, Houston’s minimum lot size
requirements may have actually increased congestion.216
217See supra notes 73-89 and accompanying text (describing regulations).
218See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (describing regulations). 
219See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text (criticizing regulations).
220I express no opinion as to whether setback requirements for houses should be retained. 
Although such laws do affect Houston’s overall density, they may harm pedestrians less
than commercial setbacks, because a pedestrian walking to a house 25 feet from the street
need only walk through a small driveway rather than walking through a larger parking lot
that he or she must share with numerous cars.  Cf. James Robinson, The Urban Frontier,
Houston Chronicle, May 28, 1995, at 24, 1995 WL 5905256 (discussing pros and cons of
setback regulations in residential context). 
221See Bivens, supra note 106 (Houston sidewalks typically 4 feet wide).
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2. Parking and Setbacks
Today, Houston’s setback requirements and minimum parking requirements
combine to force pedestrians to walk through seas of parking to reach apartments, shops
and jobs. Minimum parking requirements force landowners to build parking lots,217 and
setback rules encourage businesses to place those parking lots in front of buildings by
preventing landowners from placing buildings in the 25 feet in front of those buildings.218
Such regulations have combined to make Houston more automobile-dependent, by 
reducing density, subsidizing driving, and making pedestrian travel uncomfortable.219
Houston could solve these problems by allowing the free market to decide the
amount and placement of off-street parking - that is, by (a) eliminating minimum parking
requirements altogether, and (b) by amending its setback rules to allow commercial220
buildings to sit right next to the sidewalk (i.e. 4 feet or so from the street).221
Houston enacted minimum parking requirements in order to prevent “spillover 
parking” – a problem that occurs when a landowner does not provide enough parking to 
accommodate all motorists who wish to use his or her land, thus causing the motorists to
park on nearby streets, thus infuriating the residents of those streets (who are deprived of
222See Lori Rodriguez, Off-street parking requirements to be put before council, Houston
Chronicle, May 1, 1989, at 11, at 1989 WL 2731343 (“Proponents of the ordinance
[expanding minimum parking requirements] say the ordinance is intended to alleviate
parking problems caused by cars that spill over from businesses into neighborhoods”);
Shoup, supra note 83 (describing problem generally).
223 See County Bd. of Arlington County, Va. v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977) (upholding
similar system against equal protection challenge); Deborah Mann Lake, Parking relief,
Houston Chronicle, March 7, 2002, at 1, 2002 WL 3248173 (describing introduction of
parking permit system in Houston neighborhood).
224 Shoup, supra note 95, at 25.  It could be argued that, because the overwhelming
majority of Houstonians drive to work, see supra note 29 and accompanying text, parking
policy has less affect upon their behavior than would parking policy in a more transit-
oriented city.  But numerous case studies, even in auto-oriented cities such as Los
Angeles, show otherwise.  See Shoup, supra note 95, at 16 (citing numerous case studies
from Los Angeles, Washington and Ottawa showing that transit and/or carpooling
increased after employers began to charge for parking); Wilson, supra note 99, at 35-36
(citing another case study from Los Angeles); Paul Boudreaux, Vouchers, Buses and
Flats: The Persistence of Social Segregation, 49 Villanova L. Rev. 55, 66 (2004) (Los
Angeles “built . .  with the automobile in mind” causing “dependence on automobiles”);
Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond The Point of Cost-Justification, 56
Vanderbilt L. Rev. 653, 703 (2003) (“Doing without a private automobile in
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their own parking spaces by those motorists).222
However, minimum parking requirements are not the only possible response to 
the spillover parking problem.  Cities could just allow the free market to decide parking 
users, letting residents compete with nearby businesses and apartment buildings.  Or a 
variety of more intrusive alternatives could alleviate the spillover parking problem
without forcing the creation of acres of government-mandated parking.  For example,
some neighborhoods, both in Houston and in other cities, have instituted “residential
parking permit” districts reserving on-street parking for residents and their guests, thus
preventing commuter parking from spilling over into residential areas.223  Or cities could
price on-street parking at a level adequate to eliminate parking disputes: if prices were
high enough, the least motivated users would stop driving, and the most motivated users
would be able to find parking spaces.224
contemporary Los Angeles . . . is a hardship”).   I note that even a city that chooses to
retain its minimum parking requirements could reduce the demand for parking by
encouraging employers to allow employees to “cash out” parking benefits- that is, to
choose to forego free parking and take the cash value of a parking space instead.  See Not
Just Environmental, supra note 8, at 333 (one employer’s “cash out” experiment in
Seattle suburb reduced percentage of employees driving alone from 89% to 54%). 
225 See Central Bank & Trust Co. v . City of Miami Beach, 392 F.2d 549, 550-51 (5th Cir.
1968) (rejecting constitutional challenge to minimum parking requirement because of
link between “congested traffic [and public] health, safety and welfare”); Stroud v. City
of Aspen, 532 P.2d 720, 723 (Colo. 1975) (asserting that parking requirements necessary
to prevent “autoists [from] moving slowly around block after block seeking a place to
park . . . clog[ging] the streets, air, and ears of our citizens”). 
226Islip v. F.E. Summers Coal & Lumber Co., 177 N.E. 409, 410 (1931) (upholding
setback requirements on ground that such laws enable “business to function without
congesting the streets” because without such laws, businesses’ customers and delivery
vehicles would have to park and unload goods on the street instead of in company
parking lot).
227
 See supra notes 88-101 and accompanying text. 
228Shoup, supra note 95, at 20. 
229Thus, it could be argued that minimum parking requirements are irrational and thus
unconstitutional.  See supra note 216 (discussing similar argument in context of
minimum lot size requirements).   But this argument is likely to fail in most courts
because even if minimum parking requirements increase traffic congestion, courts might
hold that concerns over spillover parking are rational enough to justify minimum parking
requirements.  See Central Bank & Trust, 392 F.2d at 550 (land use regulations such as 
minimum parking requirements valid if “fairly debatable”).
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A common argument for both minimum parking requirements and setback 
requirements has been that such ordinances prevent the congestion and air pollution that
result when drivers move slowly around a city searching for on-street parking spaces225 or
unloading goods from those spaces.226 But if, as suggested above,227 minimum parking
requirements increase societal automobile dependency, such regulations may be “like
fertility drugs for cars”228 - that is, they may actually increase, rather than decreasing, the
number of cars on Houston streets, thus increasing traffic congestion and air pollution.229
One original purpose of Houston’s setback requirements was to enable the city to 
widen roads more easily, because large setbacks enable the city to take a few feet of
230See Robinson, supra note 220.
231See supra Part III-C. 
232See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 609 (1927)  (“projection of a building beyond the
front line of the adjacent dwellings cuts off light and air from them”); Juergensmeyer &
Roberts, supra note 13, sec. 4.13 at 91.
233
 See Gorieb, 274 U.S. at 609.  The Gorieb Court also asserted that setbacks promote
fire safety by keeping homes on the opposite side of the street far away from each other,
id., but did not explain how a fire could leap from one side of a street to another or why
60 feet of extra distance would reduce the likelihood of such a disaster.  The court further
suggested that buildings, by interfering with views of street corners, interfere with traffic
safety- but did not explain why this was so.  Id.  
234
 See Matthew J. Kiefer, Privatizing Creation of the Public Realm: The Fruits of New
York City’s Incentive Zoning Ordinance, 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 637, 639-40 (2001)
(describing zoning rules designed to preserve access to light and air in skyscraper-
dominated parts of New York City).  The discussion below assumes that such shadows
are a problem to be mitigated.  But given Houston’s intense summer heat, skyscraper-
created shadows might be a welcome source of shade.  See McGeveran, supra note 51, at
176 (Houston’s summer temperatures typically over 90 degrees and sometimes over 100
degrees).
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parking or yardspace to widen roads instead of a few feet of buildings.230  But given the
harmful effects of Houston’s wide roads upon pedestrians,231 this rationale may actually
support abolition of Houston’s traditional setback requirements.  If Houston’s setbacks
encourage the city to widen roads, and wider roads are inconvenient for Houston’s
pedestrians, Houston’s setback laws should be gutted on that basis alone. 
Setback requirements, unlike minimum parking requirements, are sometimes 
justified on aesthetic grounds - for example, by claims that they are necessary to protect
public access to light and air.232  For example, if one building is closer to the street than
adjacent buildings, the first building may reduce the light available to the second.233   This
argument makes sense in the context of high-rise buildings; for example, a tall building
could create shadows affecting the rest of the street.234  However, cities can address this
problem without mandating setbacks for all shops or houses.  For example, New York
235 See Kiefer, supra note 234, at 639.
236This exception to my proposed deregulation would not harm the interests of
pedestrians so long as the lobby of a high-rise building immediately fronted the street
rather than being separated from the street by a parking lot.  See infra notes 237-38 and
accompanying text (describing abyss-like effect which results when parking lot separates
building and street). 
237 Kunstler, supra note 83, at 138. 
238
 Id. 
239See supra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
240See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (describing effects of single use zoning
in other cities); 140 and accompanying text (describing similar reality in Houston).
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City has sought to reduce skyscraper-created shadows by “mandating streetwall setbacks
increasing as building height increased.”235 Similarly, Houston could balance concerns
over light and air with concerns over pedestrian comfort by requiring longer setbacks for
the higher stories of skyscrapers and minimal setbacks for low-rise buildings.236
More importantly, Houston’s setback rules may do more aesthetic harm than good. 
The ultimate result of setback rules (especially when combined with minimum parking
requirements) is to surround buildings with a gray wall of parking.237  In such situations,
“the unfortunate effect is [buildings’] complete failure to define space: the abyss.”238  It
follows that the alleged aesthetic benefits of setback laws may be offset by the ugliness of
a cement jungle of parking lots. 
3. Ending the Covenant with Car Dependency
As noted above, Houston’s city government encourages separation of land uses by 
enforcing covenants that bar commercial uses in residential neighborhoods.239 Thus,
Houston has created a kind of de facto “single use zoning” disguised as covenant
enforcement, and yielding the same type of automobile-dependent sprawl as other cities’
zoning codes.240  Instead, Houston should treat such covenants like any other contracts:
241See supra note 138 and accompanying text (noting that city especially willing to
enforce covenants specifying land uses). 
242See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (explaining how single use zoning
precludes such neighborhoods from coming into existence). 
243 See Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 391 (1926). 
244See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (explaining link between separation of
uses and automobile dependency). 
245Cf. Ortiz, supra note 4, at 147 n. 10 (2002) (making similar point in context of
residential streets, by pointing out that when cul-de-sac street design forces all outgoing
traffic into one or two main streets, those streets become heavily congested). 
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enforceable in court, but not sufficiently desirable that the public fisc should subsidize
such lawsuits.  If the city stopped subsidizing covenant enforcement, Houstonians would
be less likely to enforce covenants that zone neighborhoods for just one possible form of
use,241 thus increasing the number of mixed-use neighborhoods in which residents can
walk to shops and jobs.242
It could be argued that state-supported separation of residences from commerce 
is justified by the public interest in protecting residential areas from the traffic congestion
and noise that businesses attract.243  But government-encouraged separation of uses may
actually increase rather than decreasing traffic congestion, for two reasons.  First, by
forcing people to drive to jobs and shops,244 separation of uses has increased the number
of cars on Houston’s streets and expressways.  Second, where all shops are concentrated
on a few major streets those streets, by definition, have more traffic and thus more
congestion.245  And because Houstonians have to visit those streets to shop and work, they
have to put up with congestion aplenty.
It could also be argued that segregation of land uses protects neighborhoods, 
because any incursion of commerce into neighborhoods makes those neighborhoods less
246See Young v. City of Houston, 756 S.W. 2d 813, 813 (Tex. App. 1988) (upholding
Houston’s use of public funds to prosecute covenant violations on the ground that deed
restrictions “preserve the residential integrity of Houston’s neighborhoods”and maintain
property values); Euclid, 272 U.S. at 392-93 (asserting that businesses bring wide variety
of ills into neighborhoods).
247See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
248Gillham, supra note 157, at 63.  Downtowns in most other big cities are also gaining
population.  Id. at 62-63.
249See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text. 
250See supra Parts III-C and III-D.  It could be argued that wide streets improve fire
safety, by allowing large fire trucks to go through residential blocks more easily.  See
Colby, supra note 109 (noting concern).  Most fire rigs are 8-10 feet wide, and thus may
have to slow down to get through narrow streets, thus slowing response time.  Id.  But
firefighters’ needs do not justify streets as wide as Houston’s, for two reasons.  First,
firefighters may need only a 20 foot passage to fit two 8- to 10-foot fire rigs on a street at
the same time - but many American streets are over 30 feet wide, and Houston’s streets
may be as wide as 50-100 feet wide (depending on the amount of space reserved for
parking and sidewalks).  See id. (noting that fire marshals typically want 20 feet for two
fire trucks), supra notes 102-111 and accompanying text (noting difference between
Houston streets and typical American streets)  Second, the danger of auto accidents
outweighs the danger of slower fire response, because large-scale house fires are less
common than the daily inconvenience and danger caused by wide streets.  See Hamilton,
48
desirable, leading to reduced property values and ultimately neighborhood decay.246  As
noted above, the majority of Houstonians actually want to be able to walk to shops and
offices.247  And some Houstonians are backing up words with deeds: the residential
population of Houston’s central business district (by definition a mixed-use area) rose by
over 60% between 1990 and 2000.248  Thus, it is no longer plausible to assert that “mixed-
use” automatically means “declining and decaying.”
4. Street Design and Transportation
As noted above, Houston has built a thoroughly automobile-oriented street and
highway network.  Houston has more sprawl-generating limited-access highways than
most other cities,249 and Houston’s streets are so wide, have so few intersections, and have
such fast traffic that they are not comfortable for pedestrians.250  Houston’s street design
supra note 117 (“a neighborhood might experience a house fire only once every couple of
decades”); Swift, supra note 109 (one city studied suffered from 20,000 traffic accidents
and no fire-related injuries over an eight-year period).
251See supra notes 109-11 (describing typical street widths in other cities). 
252See Rose, supra note 161, at 288 (highway-induced development brings congestion to
highways).
253See TTI Study, supra note 28, The Mobility Data for Houston, TX (freeway lane miles
increased from 1385 to 2460, while arterial lane miles increased from 1500 to 2840). 
254Id.
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and transportation policies are more difficult to remedy than the more explicitly regulatory
policies described above: Houston’s streets and highways are already built, and its
municipal governments cannot make those streets narrower or shorter simply by repealing
an ordinance and allowing the free market to solve the problem.
But at a minimum, Houston’s government should amend its right-of-way 
ordinance by allowing new streets to be as narrow as those in other American cities
(typically around 20-35 feet).251 Moreover, Houston-area governments should stop
implementing policies that exacerbate Houston’s sprawl.  For example, Houstonians could
stop building new highways to Houston’s hinterlands and widening existing surface
streets.  Houston’s policy of building and widening road after road after road has been
tried and has apparently failed: in addition to driving sprawl and its noxious results, this
policy has failed to reduce congestion - perhaps because when new roads bring
development to a suburban area, the development brings cars, which means more traffic
congestion.252  Between 1982 and 2001, Houston’s freeway mileage and arterial mileage
have nearly doubled253 - yet its congestion has gotten worse.  For example, Houston’s
annual delay per person nearly doubled (from 19 hours per person to 37)254 and its
255Id.  It could be argued, of course, that Houston should have built and widened even
more roads- but the dismal results of other cities that did so suggests otherwise.  See Not
Just Environmental, supra note 8, at 69-70 (Charlotte increased road mileage by 113%,
while annual delay per driver increased by 356%).
256See Burrington, supra note 114, at 723.  And of course, Houston could also spend more
money on public transit.  See 03 Year In Review, supra note 57 (describing city’s plans
to expand rail transit).  But major public transit projects, unlike traffic calming, are
sometimes enormously expensive.  Id. (proposed expansion of light rail will cost $7.5
billion); Institute of Transportation Engineers & Federal Highway Administration,
Traffic Calming: State of the Practice 58 (1999) at www.ite.org/traffic/tcstate.htm
(Visited Feb. 18, 2004) (“ITE”) (most traffic calming measures cost $40,000 or less). 
257See Burrington, supra note 114, at 724 (noting numerous other benefits).
258For a more complete discussion of traffic calming measures, see generally ITE, supra
note 256.)
259See Freilich, supra note 55, at 557 (maximizing sidewalks helps to “make the
pedestrian rather than the automobile the primary determinant of urban form.”); Main
Street, supra note 91, at 62 (ideal sidewalk should be 12 feet).  A less ambitious remedy
is to create curb extensions, which widen a sidewalk only where space is desired for
signal poles, street furniture, or some other tangible object.  Id. at 58.   In addition,
Houston could also accommodate bicyclists by using one lane of traffic for bike lanes,
50
congestion cost per person tripled (from $219 to $711).255   If Houston slowed down its
road spending, Houston’s sprawl might be slowed as well, and its congestion might not be
significantly affected. 
If Houston-area governments spent less money on new highways and widening 
roads, they could instead spend money on “traffic calming” - that is, strategies to improve
conditions for pedestrians by slowing down motor vehicle traffic.256  In cities adopting
traffic calming, motorist convenience is balanced against pedestrian safety and
convenience, reduction of traffic accidents, and other goals.257
For example,258 Houston’s traffic engineers could calm traffic and make Houston’s 
streets safer for pedestrians by:
*Expanding sidewalks, thus making streets more comfortable for pedestrians while 
narrowing roads.259  Wider sidewalks can be used not just for walking, but also for civic
which allow people to use bicycles without coming into conflict with either motorists or
pedestrians.  Id. at 39.
260Id. at 62.
261Id. at 43.  Medians are not the only means of placing “pedestrian space” in areas
otherwise used for motorists.  Smaller “refuge islands” can create on-street refuge for
pedestrians but may be closer to one end of a street than a median, id. at  46.
262Id. at 56 (tree “canopies can create a feeling of a street edge, which helps calm
traffic”).
263The increased pedestrian-friendliness resulting from these steps should, of course, be
balanced against their cost and effect upon traffic flow.  For example, an arterial street
with lots of shops or schools that might generate pedestrian traffic is a better candidate
for traffic calming than a street in a deserted industrial area.
264And as a result, affected neighborhoods may become more desirable.  See ITE, supra
note 256, at 175 (after one arterial in Hollywood, FL reduced to two lanes with widened
sidewalks and medians, economic decline of area reversed due to creation of “pedestrian-
friendly zone”).
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amenities such as benches and sidewalk cafes.260
*Installing more medians in the middle of multilane streets, so that pedestrians 
need only cross one or two lanes of traffic at a time (rather than having to cross an entire
street at once).261
*Planting street trees, which may make streets look smaller and thus encourage 
slower driving.262
If these steps are implemented in appropriate situations,263 Houston’s streets may 
become safer and more comfortable for pedestrians.264
IV. Conclusion
It could be argued that Houston’s sprawling urban form proves that 
laissez-faire land use policy creates endless suburban sprawl, and that municipal
policymakers must therefore choose between more compact urban development and a
unfettered real estate market.  But this argument rests on a wobbly factual base – the
assumption that just because Houston purports to lack zoning, Houstonians in fact live
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under a true free-market regime.
In fact, Houston regulates land use almost as intricately as cities with zoning by
mandating suburban-style low densities, ordering businesses to hide their stores behind an
asphalt ocean of parking, encouraging segregation of land uses, and forcing pedestrians to
cross wide streets and to trudge through long, intersection-free blocks to go from one
place to another.   These policies have helped to make Houston as sprawling and
automobile-dependent as other American cities (if not more so).   By reversing such
policies, Houston and other municipalities with similar policies can create an America that
is both more deregulated and less sprawling.
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